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JUSTICE FIELD AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT*
By HOWARD JAY GRAHAM t
"It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious
sympathy for one side or the other prematurely into the law, and for-
gets that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half
his fellow men to be wrong .... When twenty years ago a vague
terror went over the earth and the word socialism began to be heard,
I thought and still think that fear was translated into doctrines that
had no proper place in the Constitution or the common law. Judges
are apt to be naif, simple-minded men, and they need something of
Mephistopheles. We too need education in the obvious-to learn
to transcend our own convictions and to leave room for much that
we hold dear to be done away with short of revolution by the orderly
change of law." 1
SIXTEEN years before Justice Holmes thus stated the case for tolerance
and self-restraint in the exercise of the judicial veto, another jurist gifted
with the power of luminous statement and self-revelation seized an oppor-
tunity to epitomize his judicial philosophy. The jurist was Associate
Justice Stephen J. Field ;2 the opportunity was the occasion presented by
his retirement from the Supreme Court of the United States after a
record-breaking term of thirty-four and a half years.
In a touching valedictory, Field recalled that he had received his ap-
pointment from President Lincoln in 1863, that previously he had served
five and a half years as justice and chief justice of the Supreme Court of
California, that he had thus rounded out more than forty years on the
state and federal bench. Now, past eighty-one, feeble to the point of
senility, yet his appearance and mien reminding one more than ever of
* "Any attempt to interpret trends in American constitutional history outside the
frame of professed doctrine calls for the utmost wariness. Its chief impulEe must Lz
the hope of stimulating confirmation or contradiction, and especially that pertinacious
inquiry into the cultural and psychological roots of legal doctrine on which very little
spadework has yet been undertaken. At best we are likely to know much less of the forces
that shaped the great judge and the development of his mind after he came to the Bench,
than we know about distinguished statesmen. Often the intellectual history of a great
judge before his appointment is largely irrecoverable." FRA-=atm, Tim Co!_Ti_=c
CLAusE UNDER ARSHA.LL, TANEY, AND VArrE (1937).
T Los Angeles County Law Library; Research Fellow in Political Science, University
of California, Berkeley.
1. See HoLms, Law and the Court in COLLEcrED LEGAL PAPES. (1920) 295.
2. See SWISHER, STEPHEN J. Fi.n, CRArFTSMAN OF THE LAw (1930) ; SomE Ac-
COUNT OF THE WoRK OF STEPHEN J. FiFm (Black and Smith ed. 18Sl).
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Michelangelo's aged figure of Moses, he concluded his valedictory with
these words:
"As I look back over the more than a third of a century that I
have sat on this bench, I am more and more impressed with the im-
measurable importance of this court. . . It has indeed no power
to legislate. It cannot appropriate a dollar of money. . . . But it
possesses the power of declaring the law, and in that is found the
safeguard that keeps the whole mighty fabric of government from
rushing to destruction. This negative power, the power of resistance,
is the only safety of a popular government. . . ." 3
The gulf between two opposing conceptions of judicial duty, and be-
tween the social and political philosophies underlying them, has probably
never been made clearer than in these contrasting statements of Justice
Holmes and Justice Field. Here, in essence, are philosophies grounded on
faith and on fear, on the premise men can govern themselves and on the
premise they must be goveriied, on the conviction that democracy must
ultimately be the preserver of the judiciary and on the conviction that the
judiciary must ultimately be the preserver of democracy. In both cases
the philosophies were integrations of experience and found their clearest
expression in prophetic interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Their very antithesis thus illumines and correlates nearly half of our con-
stitutional history.
To Justice Holmes, a skeptic with "no belief in panaceas, and almost
none in sudden ruin," an intellectual aristocrat with an Olympian faith
in "a universe not measured by our fears, a universe that has thought and
more than thought inside of it," the "provisions of the Constitution were
not mathematical formulas." Indeed, "a constitution was made for peoples
of fundamentally differing views" and "not intended to embody a partic-
ular economic theory." And because Holmes was convinced that the suc-
cessful functioning of popular government presumes "the right of a ma-
jority to embody their opinions in law." " he often felt it his duty to up-
hold legislation he believed unwise. He especially mistrusted attempts
to make the Fourteenth Amendment a bar to social and economic legis-
lation. In classic dissents he repeatedly indicated his disapproval of the
3. 168 U. S. 713-17 (1897).
4. See FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMtES (1931); Lxr, TnE DISSENTING OriN-
IONS OF MR. JusTIcE HOLMES (1929), for concise (and perhaps overdrawn) statements
of Holmes's philosophy. The writer is not here concerned how consistently justice Holmes
adhered to a philosophy of self-restraint, (note that in only one-fourth of all cases in-
volving invalidation of state laws under the Fourteenth Amendment during his term
did Holmes disagree with his colleagues) nor how frequently and tenaciously justice
Field espoused doctrines inconsistent with his principles. See FAIR-MAX, MR. JUSTICIl
MILLm AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890 (1939) 317, n. 5. The contrast of approaches
and major premises is sufficiently clear to warrant inquiry into Field's motivation,
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accordion-like process by which an "unpretentious assertion of the liberty
to follow the ordinary callings ... was expanded into the dogma, Liberty
to Contract." ' More than anything else, therefore, it was to this amazing
judicial hybridization of due process of law with the economic tenets of
laissez-faire that Justice Holmes objected.
He obviously believed that the proliferation of substantive due process
which began in the nineties and reached one of its peaks about 1910 0 was
attributable in part to conservatives' mounting fear of socialism and to
their conscious and unconscious desire to read into vague constitutional
clauses personal predilections for individualism as opposed to paternalism
in government. It is clear that he mistrusted this tendency, not because he
personally believed in socialism, for he did not, but because he was con-
vinced that in the long run judicial enforcement of laissez-faire would
prove mischievous and self-defeating. Modern urban industrial society
presumed the progressive extension of social controls; democracy pre-
sumed their extension in accordance with popular desires. Judges, too,
therefore, needed "education in the obvious"-to learn to transcend their
convictions and leave room for much they held dear "to be done away with
short of revolution by the orderly change of law." Resistance to change
might well lead courts to immolate themselves. Hypertrophy of due pro-
cess might prostrate judicial as well as legislative power. The "rule of
reason," applied as a purely reactionary formula, might lead to the rule
of force and unreason.
7
The contrast between Justice Holmes, the restrained judge solicitous
of the right of the majority to embody its opinions in law, and Justice
Field, the advocate of "resistance" and judicial trusteeship to save the
"fabric of government . . . from rushing to destruction" is manifested
both doctrinally and psychologically in Field's work. It is manifested
doctrinally by the fact that he laid the foundations for the doctrines whose
misuse and extension "to dryly logical extremes" Holmes later deplored.
To a greater or lesser degree, liberty to contract and substantive due pro-
cess are rooted in dicta in Field's majority opinions of the eighties; and
the whole modern interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment rests upon
his dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House s and Granger I cases and
upon opinions at circuit holding that corporations are "persons" within the
meaning of the equal protection and the due process clauses."0
5. Adldns v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 568 (1923).
6. See FRANKFR mER, op. cit. supra note 4, App. I.
7. See ADAms, THE THEORY OF SOCIL REM'OLUTIONS (1913), for a statement of this
thesis which may have impressed Holmes more than he was aware. Cf. 1 Hoi ,~xu-PoL-
LOCK LErTEs (Howe ed. 1941) 123-24.
8. 16 Wall. 36, 83 (U. S. 1873).
9. 94 U. S. 113, 136 (1877).
10. See San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R. R., 13 Fed. 722 (C. C. Cal. 1Z82);
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. R., 18 Fed. 385 (D. Cal. 18S3).
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The contrast is manifested psychologically by a pervading tone of anxie-
ty, by an almost total lack of that sense of relativity which so distinguish-
ed Holmes's opinions. Forebodings and premonitions,11 ungrounded fears
for the security of corporate property,12 "parades of horribles," and
threats of ruin "3 were familiar features of Field's opinions; and they
reached an anguished crescendo in the oft-quoted passage attacking the
constitutionality of the four per cent Federal Income Tax of 1895 as an
"assault upon capital . . the stepping stone to others, larger and more
sweeping, till our political contests . . . become a war of the poor against
the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness." 14
Coupled with this dark outlook was a sense of confused frustration
that at times seemed to heighten anxiety and reveal a partial awareness
that even the staunchest resistance to paternalistic trends might prove
fruitless and self-defeating. Observation of the developing frontier made
Justice Field as conscious as Henry George 15 of the parallel growth of
wealth and want, progress and poverty. That he brooded over this para-
dox, yet was powerless to resolve it, and that failure added to his troubled
state of mind is clear from an address he delivered in New York at the
centenary of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1890. Appeal-
ing for an increasingly broad enforcement of all guarantees of private
rights, he distilled his anxiety and dissatisfaction into one remarkable
sentence:
"As population and wealth increase-as the inequalities in, the con-
ditions of men become more and more marked and disturbing-as
the enormous aggregation of wealth possessed by some corporations
excites uneasiness lest their power should become dominating in the
legislation of the country, and thus encroach upon the rights or crush
out the business of individuals of small means-as population in
some quarters presses upon the means of subsistence, and angry
menaces against order find vent in loud denunciations-it becomes
more and more the imperative duty of the court to enforce with
a firm hand every guarantee to the constitution. Every decision
weakening their restraining power is a blow to the peace of society
and to its progress and improvement. .. 1
11. See Juillard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421, 470 (1884) : "From the decision of the
court I see only evil likely to follow."
12. See Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 750 (1879): "The decision will . . .
tend to create insecurity in the title to corporate property ... "
13. See Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 139 (U. S. 1874) : "If the state can say
the owner shall give the horns and hoofs, it may say he shall give the hide and the tal-
low. . . . It may say that the butcher shall retain the four quarters and return to the
owner only the head and the feet."
14. See Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 607 (1895).
15. It is interesting to note that it was during the period 1870-71, while Henry
George was editor of the San Francisco Daily Evening Post that his single tax theories
began to crystallize.
16. (1890) 24 Am. L. Rav. 351, 366-67 (italics added).
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That during his final quarter-century on the Court Field was thus ob-
viously an anxious and troubled man, committed to policies whose in-
effectiveness he sensed, yet to which he clung all the more tightly, is no
more remarkable than that his early opinions reveal a very different moti-
vation.' 7  On the bench of California from 1857 to 1863, Field distin-
guished himself by his liberality with the legislature, his readiness to sus-
tain state interference, his refusal to expand discretionary judicial review.
"Frequent elections by the people," he declared in an opinion upholding
the validity of a Sunday law, "furnish the only protection under the Con-
stitution against the abuse of acknowledged legislative power." 18 The fact
that such legislation interfered with economic liberty and freedom of con-
tract impressed him hardly at all: "The law steps in to restrain the power
of capital . . . not to protect those who can rest at their pleasure, but to
afford rest to those who need it, and who, from the condition of society,
could not otherwise obtain it." Authority for the enactment lay in "the
great object of all government, which is protection. . . . To protect labor
is the highest office of our laws." "9 Tloreover, it is striking to note that
in 1859 Field emphatically did not regard a limited due process clause of
the state constitution as a limitation on the taxing power.2
For some years after his elevation to the Supreme Court, Field held to
his tolerant views. In interpreting the contract 21 and commerce " clauses
17. See SwisERa, op. cit. supra note 2, at 77-81.
18. See Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 527 (1858). In 1861 a similar Sunday law was
upheld, Field concurring. See Ex parte Andrews, IS Cal. 679 (1861). For further evi-
dence of Field's liberality toward the legislature, see McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11, 56
(1860) ; Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 586 (1862); and 'McMurray, Field's Work
as a Lawyer and Judge in California (1917) 5 CALIF. L. RM. 87, 104.
19. See Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 520, 521 (185S).
20. See People v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343 (1859). After hearing arguments that a fund-
ing measure took property without due process of law, Field declared that "the only
limitation" on the taxing power was in the state uniformity clause. Id. at 350. It is
true that the due process clause of the California Constitutiun of 1849, Art. I, § 8, was
clearly limited to the protection of the accused "in any criminal case"; but it is also true
that such limitations were often ignored by judges who felt need for protecting private
rights. See Graham, "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment: 2 (1933)
48 YALE L J. 171, n. 47.
21. Note his concurrence with the strict constructionist minority, in Home of the
Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430 (U. S. 1869); Washington University v. Rouse, 8
Wall. 439 (U. S. 1869); Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghampton Bridge Co., 3 Wall. 51
(U. S. 1866). Field, of course, subsequently maintained opposition to bartering away the tax-
ing power. The point here is not that he turned doctrinal somersaults on points of law after
1871, but that his relative position on the Court shifted markedly to the right with the
years; befcre the seventies he was less inclined than his colleagues to void regulatory
legislation, after the seventies, more inclined.
22. See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (U. S. 186), Justice Field con-
curring, Justices Clifford, Wayne and Davis dissenting. See also Steamship Co. v.
Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450 (U. S. 1864), majority opinion by Justice Field, Justices Miller,
Wayne and Clifford dissenting.
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of the Constitution, he was less disposed than his associates to overturn
state legislation. As late as 1869, in the National Bank cases,"8 he voted
to sustain a sweeping exercise of the Federal taxing power, not as a
source of revenue, but as an instrument of social policy. In Paul v. Vir-
ginia 24 he shifted attention from the possible abuses of legislative authori-
ty to the need for regulating large aggregations of capital.
In short, until about 1870, in matters affecting property rights,
Field was a liberal, restrained judge, tolerant of legislative innovation,
who could see clearly that democratic government assumes wide margins
of error and a continual clash of opinions and interests. His philosophy
was not materially different from that of Justice Holmes in that he not
only resisted attempts to broaden the discretionary powers of the courts,
but he recognized the impropriety of making his personal views on the
soundness of social legislation the criterion of constitutionality.
The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that during the Reconstruction
period,2" and through the seventies and eighties, Field reversed himself,
not only on judicial first principles, but on fundamental concepts of his
social and political philosophy. The mild paternalist of the fifties became
the arch-individualist of the seventies and eighties. The staunch defender
of legislative power became the leader in expanding judicial review. The
judge who in 1859 had given no inkling that he regarded due process as
a limitation on the taxing power, in 1882 made it a limitation, not only
as regards natural persons, but corporations as well."0
Impressed with paradoxes of this sort, and seeking a plausible rationale,
Carl B. Swisher concluded in an interpretive chapter of his biography,
that Field found "the menace of communism . . . no idle threat." "
Field's vehement individualism, his allegiance to laissez faire, his pre-
occupation with the rights of property and corporations, his successful
efforts to broaden judicial review and make it the means of frustrating
23. See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869). Justices Nelson and
Davis dissented.
24. 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1869).
25. See Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 4
Wall. 277 (U. S. 1867). Justice Field wrote the majority opinion invalidating the
test oaths in both cases, and his predilections against such measures probably originated
as a result of his early experience in California. See SwIsHER, op. cit. supra note 2, c.
2. See also Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (U. S. 1870).
26. See San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R. R., 13 Fed. 722 (S. D. Cal. 1882)
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. R., 18 Fed. 385 (S. D. Cal. 1883). Legalists
will point out that, strictly speaking, Field did not declare corporations persons, but
rather adopted the fiction of "looking through" to the stockholders. To historians con-
cerned with practical consequences the difference is small, and the craftsmanship is note-
worthy in itself.
27. SWISHER, op. cit. sutpra note 2, at 383, 429.
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paternalistic ventures in government-all these were expressions of deep-
seated anxiety for the stability and safety of social institutions. Coura-
geous as he was in his relations with people, Field was "thoroughly fearful
of attacks upon what were to him fundamental principles in the organiza-
tion of society." 21
Thus, without stressing the fact, Swisher advanced essentially the same
hypothesis as a rationale for the paradoxes of Field's career that Justice
Holmes had offered years before as an explanation and criticism of the
general trend of judicial decision. In both instances, fear of communism
and socialism was regarded as a decisive factor in the self-expansion of
judicial power. This article will present evidence corroborative of these
views.
It now appears not only that fear of communism and radicalism was an
underlying cause of much of justice Field's distressed anxiety at the
course of democratic govermnent, but that this same fear was an im-
portant factor in bringing about the near-reversal in his views on judicial
first principles in the years following 1870. The two historic events which
served to crystallize Field's fears and affect his reorientation were the
Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune. Like many Americans
living in the chaos of the Reconstruction period, fearful that their new
industrial order might be jeopardized almost at the moment of its birth,
Justice Field was appalled at the recrudescence of revolution in Europe.
Under the cumulative impact of successive shocks, and because his per-
sonal experiences abroad and in California rendered him particularly sen-
sitive to these influences, he became an apostle of reaction, determined, in
his own later phrase, "to strengthen, if I could, all conservative men." 2.
The evidence is clearly such as to mark the Paris Commune as an im-
portant pivot in American constitutional history, a chronological and doc-
trinal key both to Justice Field's career and to the historical evolution of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.
Circumstantially, there are several major reasons for accepting this
hypothesis relating to communism and socialism and for suspecting that
it affords a clue to the expansion of the judicial power in the eighties and
nineties.
One reason is the relation between the use and growth of substantive
due process and that will to "resistance" born of overpowering anxiety
and insecurity which came eventually to characterize Justice Field's whole
28. Id. at 429.
29. Field to Matthew P. Deady, May 17, 1886, shortly after the Haymarket Riot:
"On many accounts I should be glad to go to the Pacific Coast this summer. I should
like to add my voice to strengthen, if I could, all conservative men." See note 70 infra.
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outlook. 0 It is significant in this regard that until 1870 the cases in which
substantive due process was invoked almost without exception concerned
either novel reform legislation or momentous social and partisan issues.
The determination of these questions not only stirred endless controversy
but invited a forensic use of any formula which disguised individual
opinions and gave them the sanction and prestige of a supreme funda-
mental law. Due process met these requirements perfectly and was in-
creasingly used as a weapon of last resort, as an ingenious question-beggar,
as an Archimedian lever whose adjective "due" served as the fulcrum to
shift ultimate responsibility for decisions upon social policy from the
legislature to the courts. Its advantages lay in its extraordinary simplicity,
in the universal scope of its subordinate terms, in its historic connotations
as a right derived directly from Magna Charta, and above all, in its users'
unconscious capitalization of the fact that in democratic limited govern-
ments due process as an ideal implies more than due procedure and thus
inevitably raises substantive questions.
The dangers inherent in its use were derived from its advantages, and
they were foreshadowed as early as 1818, long before the advent of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that year Chancellor
Kent stressed confidentially to the President of Dartmouth College that
his "objections," made fourteen years before as a member of the Council
of Revision, to certain changes in the New York municipal charter had
been "made as a politician, not as a judge" and that he was "not clear
that the doctrine laid down [and grounded on the state due process clause]
was correct as applied to corporations for the purposes of government." 31
Possibly these scruples of Chancellor Kent against the extension of "law
of the land" beyond historical and textual limitations contributed to Web-
ster's and Marshall's shift in the Dartmouth College case to the contract
clause as the major bulwark for corporate rights.
Yet during the Jacksonian period, as the number and importance of
corporations increased-even in the face of growing popular hostility-
conscientious judges continued to ignore phraseological limits and on sev-
eral occasions indicated that their willingness to stretch the meanings of
key words was prompted by general mistrust of legislative trends and
policies. 2 Illustrating this tendency, and in a sense broadening and cul-
minating it, was the epidemic of substantive use of federal and state con-
stitutional terms that broke out in the mid-fifties. In swift succession the
30. See Graham, The "Cospiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment (1938) 47
YALE L. J. 371, (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 171, especially notes 11 and 36 of second part.
31. SHiRLFY, THE DARTMtOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES (1895) 270, letter of Francis Brown
to Daniel Webster, September 15, 1818. See Howe, A Footnote to the "Conspiracy
Theory" (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1007.
32. See Graham, supra note 20, notes 37, 47.
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New York Court of Appeals ifivalidated on the ground of that state's
due process clause a married woman's property act " and a drastic anti-
liquor law,3" and counsel for insurance companies and railroads attempted
unsuccessfully to void state regulation and charter repeals. Republicans
in Congress and on the stump brandished the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment as a weapon against slavery; and in 1857 the elderly
Taney, seeking to bolster what others would destroy, vainly turned the
tables on his opponents and denied Congress power over slavery in the
Territories.3 5 It is plain that substantive due process is a weapon bu rn
of political stress, that its use flourishes in periods of crisis and under the
pressure of intense conviction. It should occasion little surprise, therefore,
if counsel and judges frightened by socialism and communism fell back
upon this guarantee in the troubled Reconstruction period.
Another circumstance supporting the hypothesis is implicit in Chancel-
lor Kent's statement: "I have likewise imbibed from the stupendous
events of the French Revolution an aversion to innovation except by
cautious steps."' 6 In view of the fact that conservatism and radicalism
are reciprocal and self-neutralizing forces, that the Terror of 1791-93
contributed to the establishment mad early growth of judicial review in
the United States,3" that successive French revolutions each produced
widespread psychological repercussions in this country,39 and that the
great European revolutions of 1848, occurring simultaneously with the
birth of Marxism and promulgation of the Communist Manifesto, tended
to combine in American minds a horror of the traditions of violence with
a mistrust of such ill-fated collectivist experiments as Louis Blanc's
National Workshops 4U--in view of these facts, it would scarcely be sur-
prising to learn that fear of communism and radicalism played its part
33. See Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202 (1854).
34. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378 (1,55).
35. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 450 (U. S. 1856).
36. Howro-x, JA.nEs KENT (1939) 271, quoting an undated letter to Edward Living-
ston, published in (1837) 16 Am. JURIS 361, in which Kent explained his reasons for pre-
ferring the common law to codes.
37. See WOLFE, CONSERVATISm, RADIcAuS. AND THE SCW.TIFIC MrroD (1923).
38. Beveridge brilliantly sketched the influence of the French Revolution in Amer-
ica concluding that there was "scarcely an incident" in Marshall's private e.xperience "but
was shaped and colored by this vast series of human events." 2 BEvMlME, JOEN MN -
sHALL (1929) c. 1, 44.
For further insight, see the speeches of Federalist members of Congress in the debates on
the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, especially speeches of Senator Ogden, 11 AN.:;As
OF CONG. 171 (1851) ; Representative James C. Bayard, 11 A.mNAs or CoNG. 627 (1851);
and Representative John Rutledge, 11' ANNALS OF CoNG. 746 (1851).
39. See GAZLEY, AmERIc-u OPINION OF GERMN UN IcATION, 184S-1871 (1926)
247; Curtis, Avwrican Opinion of French Ninceteenth Ce tury Rmeoliion (1914) 19 A..
HisT. REv. 249.
40. Ibid.
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either in conditioning Field's outlook or in coloring his views on social
and economic policy.
This is especially true in view of the further fact that at the time when
Justice Field's opinions were veering more and more in the direction of
conservatism, he had reason to be troubled by the trend of domestic affairs
and by his colleagues' decisions.4 These were the months of the Tweed
Ring exposures, the aftermath of the Erie Wars and Gold Corner, and the
impeachment of President Johnson-mbnths of widespread demoraliza-
tion in all departments of government, state and national-and months
characterized more than anything else by growing public antipathy and
contempt for the policies and personnel of state and national legis-
latures.4" For a War Democrat who had hoped for magnanimity toward
the South, who had welcomed the Fourteenth Amendment 43 only to see
it turned into an instrument for radical aggrandizement, who publicly
deplored the majority of the Court's refusal to invalidate the Congressional
reconstruction program, they were the agonizing months of democracy's
Gethsemane. Far from bringing improvement and relief from these con-
ditions, the spring of 1871 intensified them. During this time the recon-
stituted Supreme Court reversed the Legal Tender 44 decisions, in which
Field had concurred, and upheld, over his dissent, legislation authorizing
confiscation of Confederates' property.4 5 Legislatures in the Granger
states debated and passed the first statutes that established maximum rates
41. One can hardly fail to note here how suddenly, during Reconstruction, the tides
of fortune shifted for Field. A Union Democrat, bullionist, friend and brother of rising
capitalist-promoters, he shared to the full the elation over Union victory and the phe-
nomenal material successes of his time, only to see the whole suddenly threatened, after
1866, by a motley crew of Radicals, Greenbackers, and Grangers. Increasingly circum-
scribed in personal contacts, unfamiliar (rather than unsympathetic) with the lot of small
farmers and laborers, inclined to judge eastern and midwestern legislation of the seven-
ties and eighties by California conditions and standards of the fifties, he thus suffered
equally from the handicaps of his position and experience and from the general demorali-
zation of the times.
42. See editorials, San Francisco Alta, Nov. 13, 1870 ("A legislature so tied
• . . that it cannot move at all is . . . the greatest of blessings."). Disregard of Con-
stitutions, Sacramento Union, Nov. 8, 1870, citing flagrant evasions of prohibitions against
subsidies and lotteries.
43. See especially, Field to Chief Justice Chase, June 30, 1866, quoted in SwIsHER,
op. cit. supra note 2, 144-45.
44. See Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1871), rellg Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall.
603 (U. S. 1870), decided May 1, 1871, by a 5 to 4 vote. Intra-court bitterness remained
intense throughout 1870-71. See FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREMIE
CoutT (1939) c. 7; SwIsHER, op. cit. supra note 2, c. 7.
45. See Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268 (U. S. 1871). In his dissent Field de-
dared that "the same reason which would sustain the authority of the government to
confiscate the property of a traitor would justify the confiscation of his property when
guilty of any other offense." Id. at 323.
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and regulated the businesses of grain elevators and railroads."0 Radicals
in Congress pushed through the drastic Ku Klux Klan act.4 Finally, as
if to personalize the confusion and heartbreak of the entire period, Field's
elder brother and patron, David Dudley, for months under ceaseless at-
tack for his activities as counsel for Fisk and Gould in the Erie Wars,
was now engaged in a battle for his professional and moral reputation. 5
In these circumstances can be perceived a basis for acute psychological and
judicial maladjustment. The precise focus is admittedly difficult to estab-
lish with precision; yet the biographical significance is readily apparent.
The view that Justice Field's retreat from his early liberalism stemmed
in part from events of 1870-71 is further supported by the circumstance
that it was during this period that the equal protection, due process, and
privileges or immunities clauses first clearly emerged as bulwarks of a new
capitalist order. One need not assume that Field intuitively, or at the cost
of great intellectual effort, discovered these potentialities for himself. For,
prompted by two influential and provocative syntheses of the case law 
and encouraged to seek the sort of substantive protection which Chief
Justice Chase had invoked in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold, " lav.yers
throughout the nation, from California to Maine, began barraging courts
with appeals against advancing state regulation 11 and Reconstruction rnis-
46. See letter to Chief Justice Chase, June 30, 1866, quoted in Swsra, op. Cit. spra
note 2, at 145-46.
47. 17 STAT. 13-15 (1871). President Grant's message of March 23, calling for sup-
pression of the outrages in the South preceded enactment and touched off a month-long
debate on the scope and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. See notes 86, 83 in ra,
and John Norton Pomeroy's unsigned article, The Force Bill (1871) 12 NroN 26S.
48. See Stickney, The Lawyer and His Clients, and Adams, An Eric Raid in Hics,
HIGH FINANcE IN THE SIXTIES (1929), which assembles materials bearing on both sides
of the controversy.
49. COOLEY, CONSTITUTONAL LIrITATIONS (1863) (with its chapter X1 "On the
Protection of Property by 'the Law of the Land'"), and PoMEnoYr, CONSTITLoNAL Lw
(1868) were both published almost simultaneously with ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See especially COoLEY, supra at 356-57, Po'-zaoY, sittra at 156-0e.
50. 8 WalL 603, 624 (U. S. 1870). Clarkson N. Potter, one of the leading counsels,
had raised the point.
51. See Ex parte Smith and Keating, 3S Cal. 702 (1869), where counsel unsuccess-
fully attacked a Sacramento ordinance prohibiting music and the presence of women in
saloons after midnight. See also the line of Maine due process, Fourteenth Amendment
cases antedating the Slaughter-House decision. Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590
(1871) (state due process); Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1872) (state due process);
Maine v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504 (1872) (Fourteenth Amendment); Dunn v. Burleigh,
62 Me. 24 (1873) (Fourteenth Amendment). See also Chief Justice Lawrence's opin-
ion in Chicago-Alton R. R. v. People, 67 Ill. 11 (1873), substantially holding corpora-
tions persons "so far as necessary to protect their property and franchises against the
operation of a law that . . . condemns without a trial." Id. at 24. Due process, both
federal and state, came rapidly to the fore in the Granger Cases in the state cQurts, 1872-
73. Arguments printed in 2-4 A-NUAL REPoRTs OF THE Ih.Liois RtaLrOAs A D IVA=-
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rule. 2 Along with the trends of usage thus established, strategists for the
insurance companies which had asked Congress for relief while the Four-
teenth Amendment was being drafted,5 3 sought to profit by its broad
phraseology. Early in the first session after ratification, John A. Bingham,
drafter of section one and the chairman of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, sponsored a bill " skillfully designed to extend to corporations the
HOUSE CoMMISSION (1872-1874) indicate that Corydon Beckwith, Chief Counsel for the
Chicago and Alton Railroad and the Northwestern Fertilizing Co. pioneered the usage,
though he apparently was much handicapped by Judge Woods's decision in Coiliwntal
Insurance Co. v. New Orleans. See note 56 infra. Judge Drummond's decision in North-
western Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 Fed. Cas. 394 (C. C. Ill. 1873), holding cor-
porations persons within the Civil Rights Act of 1871, promised partial relief, but was
immediately overshadowed by the Supreme Court's decision in the Slan ghter-House Cases.
It was not until after the Bartemeyer decision that counsel again took heart. One
then finds James C. Storrs, Chief Counsel for the Central Pacific Railroad, advising Cali-
fornia subordinates to make use of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in various tax cases then pending. Storrs to S. W. Sanderson, May 17, 1874, 6 HUNT-
ixOTON CORREsPoNDENCE (1874) 175, Stanford University Library.
52. See the ingenious argument of A. W. Shaffer in Worthy v. Commissioners, 9
Wall. 611 (U. S. 1870) (unsuccessfully employing section one of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a weapon to defeat the provisions of section three), and the masterpiece of re-
search and opportunism prepared by former Justice John A. Campbell as counsel for the
butchers in the various Slaughter House cases [State v. Fagan, 22 La. 545 (1870) and
16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873)]. It is interesting to note that Campbell in his arguments before
the Supreme Court in 1872 and 1873 stressed the potentialities of section one as a bul-
wark against Communism and Socialism. See CONNOR, JOHN A. CAMPBEL (1920) 214.
53. See Graham, supra note 30, n. 86.
54. See House Bill 349, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. (1869). The text of this measure is
not found in the Congressional Globe. It was repeatedly referred to, however, as a sweep-
ing bill which extended to corporations "the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States," i.e., under both the comity clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Apparently no serious move was made to secure passage until after the Supreme
Court in Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410 (U. S. 1871), and Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass.,
10 Wall. 566 (U. S. 1871), had cleverly put an end to hopes of judicial relief. On Feb.
15, 1871, after the Senate had acted unfavorably on a much less sweeping substitute
measure, Bingham sought House action on the same substitute. See CoNG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 3d Sess. (1871) 538, 715, 1288-90. This revised bill provided, he explained, "first,
that no corporation created by any State of this Union shall be subjected to forfeiture
or penalty for bringing a suit authorized by the laws of the United States. . . . Second,
that being ruled to be citizens of the United States within the meaning of the Consti-
tution to the extent that they shall be entitled as such to sue and be sued in the courts
of the United States, by virtue of their citizenship under the Constitution, against the
citizens of any other State, they are therefore, of necessity, within the ruling of the
Court, under the protection of that provision of the Constitution of the United States
which gives them in whatever State they may be found no greater disability in reference
to trade and commerce than the citizens of the state in which they live."
"That, Sir," Bingham added (with reference to the first half of the statement, and
in apparent hopes listeners might conclude he was speaking of the whole) "is the ruling
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privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. After Congress
had rejected this measure, and after Justice Bradley's and Judge WNroods's
decisions in the Slaughter-House Cases at circuit " had seemed to take for
granted that corporations - or at least shareholders - were protected by
the phraseology of section one, the insurance company lawyers turned
again to the courts and sought Judge Woods's express ruling on corporate
personality and citizenship. In a remarkable volte face that dismayed
the entire insurance bar, Judge Woods ruled in Continental Insurance
Company v. New Orleans,56 in 1871, that corporations were neither "citi-
zens" nor "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whatever may be one's views on the bearing of these facts on the
problem of the framers' intentions,"7 it is obvious that there early de-
made and adhered to by the Supreme Court of the United States for moire than fifty
years."
Like other skeptics, the writer has often asked, "Why, if framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to aid or include corporations in 1866, no evidence has been found
that identifies them with such usage in the years immediately following ratification"?
With reference to corporate benefits under the citizenship clause, it now appears that such
evidence is at hand. Neither the circumstances of the utterance, nor Bingham's stand-
ing and abilities as a constitutional lawyer seem to the writer to be consistent with Pro-
fessor McLaughlin's view that the argument just quoted indicates Binghams ignorance
of what the Court recently had held in the Paul, Ducat, and Litvrpool cases. See note 57
infra.
55. See Livestock Dealers & Butchers Association Y. Crescent City Livestozlz
Landing & Slaughter House Co., 4 Fed. Cas. 891 (C. C. La. 1870).
56. 13 Fed. Cas. 67 (C. C. La. 1870). Judge Woods reasoned much as did Mr. Jus-
tice Black in his dissent in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnsvn, 303 U. S.
77 (1938), i.e., that since only natural persons can be "born or naturalized" a double
standard of interpretation of the word "person"' in section one is required to mahe the due
process and equal protection clauses cover corporations. So far as the framers' intentions
are concerned, this argument of course ignores the fact that the introductory sentence
defining citizenship was added in the Senate, and did not appear in the Joint Committee's
drafts. See note 82 infra.
57. Possibly unaware that Bingham had first introduced the broader Hume Bill 349,
41st Cong., 1st Sess. (1869), Professor McLaughlin minimizes the importance of immu-
diate post-ratification use of section one by insurance companies. See McLaughlin, The
Court, the Corporation, and Conkling (1940) 46 Aimi. HisT. REv. 45, 50-51. He further
questions whether corporate activity in Congress caused framers to consider applicability
of the section to corporations.
Pending Harris L. Rubin's completion of a projected biography of Bingham, the
writer is unprepared to carry skepticism so far. Evidence not only corroborates Con!:-
ling's statements with regard to the corporation petitions but reveals several possible lin!:s
between members of the Joint Committee on the one hand, and between prior users of due
prcess and current (i.e., 1866) seekers after federal protection on the other. See Gra-
ham. loc. cit. supra note 20. Consequently, the writer feels that the so-called "secondary
intention hypothesis" best accords with the facts as they stand: Bingham and his col-
leagues drafted section one to safeguard the rights of Negroes, mulattoes and Southern
loyalists. Yet they probably soon became aware, by reason of the iwmurance company and
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veloped-and while Field was in a mood to have appreciated its timeliness
-a pattern of constitutional usage strikingly like the one that he event-
ually championed. Not only in Congress but in the courts, well-organized
campaigns were under way to make the Fourteenth Amendment a shield
against what many businessmen and conservatives regarded as dangerous
and excessive regulation. It is no great act of faith to believe that these
maneuvers came to the atter~tion of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States and that he probably formulated conclusions as to their
merits.
Finally, climaxing the circumstantial case, is the fact that a great social
cataclysm-the first to be reported by cable and exploited by modern
journalistic devicess---may well have been one of the decisive factors in
railroad petitions, and as draftsmen obliged to consider all meanings of their texts, that
"persons" as a generic term embraced corporations.
Speculation ought not to proceed much beyond this point, but Bingham's acceptance
of Credit Mobilier stock in 1866 suggests that the anti-slavery zealot of the fifties was now
on intimate terms with business leaders, and inclined to favor their programs. His orig-
inal positively-worded draft-"Congress shall have power . . ."-harmonized nicely
with the needs and aims of petitioning business interests. Together with such colleagues
as Reverdy Johnson and Roscoe Conkling he probably saw no reason to oppose phrase-
ology which offered prospects of incidental Congressional or judicial aid to beleaguered
railroads and insurance companies. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that
Radicals in 1866 not only assumed Congress to have plenary powers under the Amend-
ment but were currently solidifying their alliances with business. See BEALE, Tim CaiTi-
CAL YEAR (1930). In the last analysis, therefore, belief in a secondary intent to aid busi-
ness presumes little more than a decent respect for the framers' intelligence and a willing-
ness to believe that intelligent and informed men did not rigidly compartmentalize concep.
tions of "persons" and "due process" but adopted prevalent conceptions which harmonized
with their general views of statecraft.
Perhaps for these reasons it is difficult for the writer to accept Professor McLaugh-
lin's view that Bingham's failure to cite decisions in which the Supreme Court had re-
cently blasted counsel's hopes of judicial protection under the comity and commerce
clauses signified ignorance of these decisions and presumably ignorance of any company
plans for Congressional protection under the comity clause and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Silence here might also be construed as discretion, though as the writer has pointed
out elsewhere, silence in such cases is admissible neither as proof of intent, nor the lack
of it.
In those railroad charter cases in which Reverdy Johnson had successfully figured
as counsel just prior to his membership on the Joint Committee, and in which due process
arguments had been used, it may be added that the cases were decided favorably to the
railroads a few months before the Fourteenth Amendment was declared officially ratified.
See Graham, supra note 22, at 186-90; Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. R.,
58 Pa. 26 (1868). Continued citation of such cases as Brown v. Hummell, 6 Pa. 86
(1847), and Erie R. R. v. Casey, 1 Grant's Cases 274 (Pa. 1856), indicates that Reverdy
Johnson continued to rely on due process, although the decision turned on other points.
58. Tremendous sums were spent by the American press for cable tolli and corres-
pondence during the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune. See LEE, HIsToRY
OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1923) 328-29. Contemporary readers probably gained a sense
of the immediacy of events which is difficult for jaded moderns to appreciate. Field's cor-
19431 FIELD AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 865
reorienting Field's outlook. Simultaneously with the most depressing
personal and national crises in the spring of 1871, the Paris Commune "'
shocked the entire world, discredited collectivist and radical programs,
and produced a hysteria in conservative circles in the United States
Which caused such current indigenous forms of radicalism as the Granger
and labor movements to be attacked as conspiracies against the institution
of property.
These effects are most strikingly revealed in E. L. Godkin's editorials
in The Nation 60 and by the repercussions of the Commune in California.
Familiarity with French revolutionary backgrounds and with the Marx-
ian thesis and program currently propagandized by the Internationale
led Godkin to anticipate outbreaks which, after their first occurrence in
October, 1870, during the Siege, and especially after the carnage and in-
cendiarism that finally marked the Communards' overthrow in May, 1871,
prompted repeated editorial probing of domestic affairs. Mounting labor
unrest, sectional, class and partisan antagonisms, legislative and exec-
utive demoralization, the greed and lawlessness of capital-all ominous
in themselves-were now viewed against still darker backgrounds. Appall-
ed at these "unforeseen tendencies of democracy," Godkin not only flinched
at the thought of increased state interference and argued that nothing
could be accomplished by legislation toward reconciling capital and labor,
but rebuked such humanitarians and reformers as John Stuart Mill and
Wendell Phillips for their espousal of labor and land reforms which, he
declared, would only encourage irresponsible fanatics to make greater
demands.
This same impairment of reason and social sympathy by acts of violence
is even more forcibly illustrated by the aftermath of a miners' strike in
Amador County, California. 61 Bitter against "Amador Communists" who
respondence often glowed with fraternal pride and wonder at the miracle of the cable and
telegraph; potentialities of the instruments fascinated him, and apparently he pondered
deeply their significance and reports.
59. For the modern view of this complex upheaval, which uniformly emphasizes its
spontaneous, heterogeneous, often chauvinistic and proletarian, but essentially non-
Marxian and unsocialistic character, see Bourgin, The Paris Commune in 4 ENcYc. Soc.
ScizxcEs (1931) 63-66; MASON, THE PARIs COMMaIUNE (1930). Mason concluded: "The
revolution of March 18th was the product of a spontaneous uprising of an easperated
populace." Id. at 133. Compare contemporary accounts in the New York Herald, San
Francisco Alta, and FETRIDGE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PAIS Co'x us m (1871), all
of which tended to exaggerate the role of the Internationale and Marxists in fomenting
revolt.
60. See particularly: The French Republic, Oct. 27, 1870; The 'Red' Uprising in
Paris, March 23, 1871; La Commune, April 13, 1871; 'The Commune' and the Labor Ques-
tionz, Mlay 18, 1871; The Objectives of the Commune, Mfay 25, 1871; Con:isnstic Moral-
ity, June 15, 1871 ; The Fiuture of Capital, June 22, 1871. The titles themselves, and their
sequence, convey something of the impact on Godkin's thinking.
61. See Caoss, His'oR OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN CAxroran (1935) 63; and
the San Francisco Bulletin, San Francisco Chronicle and San Francisco Alta, June 23
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had stopped the pumps, damaging property to the value of $100,000, after
failing to gain demands for a three-dollar wage and abandonment of the
twelve-hour day, San Francisco's leading daily, the San Francisco Alta,"
sensationalized a drunken brawl which occurred shortly after the with-
drawal of state troops from the scene of the strike and represented it as a
desperate assault upon organized government and property. A remarkable
editorial entitled "The Federal Authority and the Amador Conspiracy" 11
climaxed appeals for judicial as well as renewed military protection. In
the editor's judgment both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ku Klux
Act gave the federal courts ample powers to deal with such violence, so
that if the value of mining property were again endangered, it was their
duty to exercise these powers.
These circumstances afford impressive documentation of the view that
fear of socialism and radicalism may have profoundly affected Justice
Field and the course of judicial history. Recurrence of revolution abroad,
in conjunction with Reconstruction and the rise of the regulatory
movement at home, obviously stimulated an opportunist "natural rights"
use of all the clauses of section one. Bingham's triple-reinforced but
highly ambiguous phraseology ' literally collapsed under the threat of
to August 1, 1871. Violence was first reported June 23 while papers were still filled with
news of suppression of the Communards. Troops were withdrawn July 15th. The Orange-
men riots in New York City on July 12, 1871, in which more than 100 persons were
killed and 300 wounded, likewise alarmed law-abiding citizens and excited fears of in-
creasing social instability. (See San Francisco Alta, July 26, 1871; San Francisco Chron-
icle, July 15, 1871, reprinting editorials of the Chicago Tribune and New York Tribune).
62. The San Francisco Alta's accounts, later acknowledged to have been sensational-
ized (see issues of July 29 and 30) were so virulent in attacks on the miners, as to lend
weight to the charge that McCrellish, publisher of the San Francisco Alta, held a large
financial interest in the mines.
63. July 26, 1871. Most alarming feature of the affair in the San Francisco Alta's
eyes was the fact that public opinion, especially in the Amador district, supported the
miners and acknowledged their grievances. Unreconciled to the discovery that it had lost
its strictly "private" character, property appealed for military sanctions, and invoked aid
of the recently-passed Ku Klux Klan Act and Fourteenth Amendment.
And it is here that one encounters the most puzzling--or impressive-of all circum-
stances: John A. Bingham, drafter of section one, returned -temporarily to San Fran-
cisco from Oregon (where he had continued his stumping for the Republican ticket) on
July 24th-the day of the renewed violence at Sutter Creek, the day before the newspapers'
reports thereof, and two days before publication of the San Francisco Alta's leader, The
Federal Authority and the Amador Conspiracy I No substantial evidence has been found
linking Bingham with this suggested use of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore,
it is obvious that editorial opportunism affords a perfectly adequate explanation of such
usage. Numerous brief reports of Bingham's remarks do show, however, that section
one-and especially the equal protection clause-constituted the core and refrain of nearly
every speech. Possibly the Bingham papers hold the clue to this baffling circumstance.
But a preliminary search, undertaken by Dr. Austin Hutcheson of the University of
Nevada, disclosed nothing in the correspondence of the framers bearing on these matters.
64. See Graham, The Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Antwndmnent: 2 (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 371, 397-400.
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universal usage. Obliged to deal at once with the one problem which had
all but escaped the framers' attention-namely, which department of gov-
ernment was charged with delimiting the states' powers-the federal
courts were thrust into a deadly cross-fire between Confederates and Radi-
cals and corporations and Grangers. Statesmanship in such a situation
called for curtailment of jurisdiction, and this in turn required retreat
from the advanced position originally taken by Justice Bradley and judge
Woods." Yet manifestly there were definite limits to judicial caution and
self-restraint. Resolve to uphold historic state powers and prestige of the
courts during a prolonged national crisis could in the long run only inten-
sify appeals for judicial protection. Ebbing respect for legislatures and
mounting fears of revolt, on the other hand, progressively undermined the
confidence and security which were the bulwarks of judicial self-restraint.
Above all, the courts most emphatically had not totally rejected the doc-
trines of corporate personality and liberty of contract.00 They had re-
jected merely the uses to which those doctrines had been put.
Our problem now is to determine the relevancy and application of these
general circumstances. Did Justice Field react to the Conmune in sub-
stantially the same manner as Godkin and the editor of the Alta? Is it
likely that he learned of the Amador riot and shared the reactions of his
California friends? "' Is there anything in his correspondence that shcds
light on this episode and points to its biographical importance?
Additional circumstantial, as well as direct contemporaneous, evidence
suggests affirmative answers to these questions. It appears that Justice
65. That is, in the Slaughter-House Case at circuit, 4 Fed. Cas. S91 (C. C. La. 1S70).
The concluding paragraphs of Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in the same case before
the Supreme Court, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873), aimed at what he called the "argument
from inconvenience," emphasize how heavily political and practical considerations weight-
ed the majority opinion.
66. See Justice Miller's opinion in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, IS Wall. 129, 133 (1873);
and Chief Justice Waite's dictum in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 713 (1879),
assuming corporations to be persons within the meaning of the due process clauses oi
the Constitution. Consider too, that the Court in the State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S.
575 (1875); in the Granger Cases, 94 U. S. 155 ot seq. (involving corporations) ; and in
Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521 (1377), while obviously dismayed at the increas-
ing economic and substantive usage of due process, nevertheless tacitly permitted corpora-
tions to continue raising the point. Indeed, the latter case vas argued the day Justice
Miller delivered his oft-quoted rebuke of due process misusers in Davidskn V. New Or-
leans, 96 U. S. 97, 102-03 (1877). Yet the fact that the Supreme Court four years later
(in 1882) permitted lengthy arguments on the point of corporate personality cautions
against the view that there were no doubts or reservations in the Justices' minds in 1879-
79 at the time of Waite's dictum. Probably few questions have raised more momentous
and confusing problems in seemingly simple form than the questions whether corporations
should be permitted to challenge state legislation under the due process clauses.
67. It is not to be overlooked, for example, that D. D. Colton, later the business asso-
ciate of Stanford and Huntington, and, intimate friend of Field, was president of the
Amador Mine. See SWISHER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 247.
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Field arrived in San Francisco on July 10, 1871,18 five days before with-
drawal of troops from the Amador mines, and was holding circuit court
there when the Alta bore the news: MORE TROUBLE IN AMADOR. REIGN
OF TERROR IN SUTTER CREEK. MASKED MINERS HUNTING FOR MINE
OFFICERS. AMADOR MINE STILL IN POSSESSION OF OWNERS. BADGER
SHAFT OF THE AMADOR MINE ON FIRE. THE WAR SAID TO BE JUST
COMMENCED. Under these circumstances it would have been remarkable
if the Alta's suggested applications of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Ku Klux Act failed to receive his earnest consideration.
The real importance of the Amador episode is indicated, however, not
by these circumstances, but by a reference in a letter written six months
earlier. On December 12, 1870, during the siege of Paris and shortly
after the first outbreaks (" that eventually culminated in the Commune,
Field excused his neglect of a correspondent stating, "For months the
stirring events occurring in Europe have absorbed my thoughts to the
exclusion of almost everything else, except the duties which I have been
obliged to discharge from day to day." "
It is not difficult in the light of his known experiences before 1870 to
account for this preoccupation. Unlike most Americans, Field knew the
meaning of revolution; he had witnessed it at first hand, and his life and
environment had been among the best proofs of its folly.
An impressionable New England-bred law clerk of thirty-two, off for
a wanderjahr 1 with his elder brothers and sisters, he had arrived in Paris
68. See San Francisco Alta, July 10, 1871, p. 1, col. 2.
69. American papers devoted considerable attention to an abortive assault on the
Hotel de Ville led by Gustave Florens, October 31. See the telegraphic dispatches, San
Francisco Alta, Nov. 5-10, 1870; editorial comment in the Sacramento Union, Nov. 5,
1870, N. Y. Herald, Nov. 4, 5, 9, 1870; and delayed accounts in the San Francisco Alta,
Dec. 1-10, 1870.
70. To Matthew P. Deady, United States District Judge, 1859-1893, and one of Ore-
gon's most distinguished citizens. The Field-Deady correspondence consisting of 156
letters extending over the period 1865-1893 is preserved with other Deady papers in the
archives of the Oregon Historical Society, Portland.
71. See SWISHER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 22-23. As nearly as can be reconstructed
from his Reminiscences and from family sources, Field sailed from New York in June,
1848, with his father; they were met in London by his brother Henry; the party pro-
ceeded through Belgium to Paris and spent several days there while the city still bore
the scars of the "Bloody Days of June." After touring the provinces, and perhaps Ger-
many, the family wintered in Paris. At Galignani's news room in December, Field read
President Polk's message confirming the discovery of gold in California, but resolved to
complete his travels as planned. In the spring, joined by Cyrus and family, the party
journeyed through Italy, arriving in Rome just after lifting of the siege and occupation
by French troops. Severe fighting was under way in Hungary when the party reached
Vienna.
There is no evidence that the tour during the year of the revolutions was more than
mildly exciting; but it would have been remarkable if Field, having been in Paris during
Louis Napoleon's election as President and shortly after promulgation of the Communist
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in July, 1848, just after General Cavaignac's suppression of the barri-
cades, the discredit and collapse of the Provisional Government, and its
unsuccessful experiments with Louis Blanc's National Workshops. Cton-
tinuing their grand tour, the Fields witnessed outbreaks in Ro me and
Vienna, the beginnings of German unification and .Marxian socialism,
the seethings and travail of a whole continent in ferment. After more
than a year abroad, Field returned to New York, and sailed almost
immediately for gold-rush California.7 -
During the next two decades, borne on by the exhilarations and oppor-
tunities of a rapidly growing nation, Field advanced swiftly from law
clerk to Alcade, to legislator, to justice, to chief justice of the state su-
preme court, and finally to Associate justice of the highest Court in the
land. In 1870-71, reviewing the miracle of the frontier against embittered
talk of class war and the bloody struggles of Communards and anti-
Communards, the man who barely twenty years before had, penniless,
walked the streets of San Francisco exclaiming, "Isn't it glorious! Isn't
it glorious I" turned his thoughts to the problem of ordering society to
escape the horrors of revolution " and to safeguard institutions -" he
held dear.
More and more, beginning in the seventies. justice Field tended to
condemn, where earlier he had approved, legislation regulating the use and
acquisition of property." Historically considered, it was Field's tragic
Manifesto, had evinced no more than casual interest, twenty-two years later, in the
collapse of Napoleon's Second Empire, and in a sudden resurgence of Miarxism.
72. He landed in New York, October 1, 1849; and six weeks later sailed for Califur-
nia via the Isthmus, arriving in San Francisco, December 28, 1849.
73. See FnmD, RamilSCrxCas (1893) 6-7.
74. Apparently the David Dudley Fields were in Paris during the Commune. D&%wv's
jouxrAL, entry May 9, 1871. It is possible that their accounts or experiences intensified
Field's reactions.
75. Though too much easily could be made of the fact, there is fragmentary evidence
which suggests that Field felt his childlessness keenly, that a sense of frustration, which
would have increased in the seventies with the certainty that he was to remain without
issue, may have been an unfathomable influence in his life. See the letter of Oct. 19, 18266,
congratulating Deady on "the happy event which is to be," and adding "would that like
good fortune was to happen to me." See also the request made of his brother-in-law,
G. E. Whitney, dated Dec. 16, 1869, that a new-born niece be christened Stephanie. See
DEADY CoL.cio, FliLD PoRTFoLio.
One feels at least that the almost religious regard for the family and home which
pervades Field's correspondence (which made Marxism doubly loathsome), owed its
poignancy and compulsion in part to this circumstance.
76. See his dissenting opinion in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 750 (1879);
and compare the views expressed in Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (18S) ; and other
cases cited note 18 supra. See also his concurrence with Justice Bradley's dissent-
ing opinion in Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Vall. 5, 38 (U. S. 1873) (wherein the minority
favored exemption from state taxation of the property of federal-chartered and subsi-
dized Pacific railroads. Note that Field earlier had concurred with the unanimous deci-
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confusion that made the aftermath of Civil War and the conduct and
program of desperate Parisians denied security, self-government, and
justice, the test of democracy's validity and strength. Yet in the light of
what Field had seen and experienced his confusion was not unnatural.
Probably most individuals, reared in his environment, witnessing the same
contrasts and suffering the same shocks and disappointments, would have
reacted in much the same manner.
The historian's problem, therefore, is not merely one of explaining
Justice Field's reorientation, but of undertaking to guage its consequences.
This task involves exploring the relation between Field's personal anxiety
and his role as the leading apostle of laissez-faire and broadened judicial
review. What remains obscure, yet is plainly essential to the understand-
ing of recent constitutional history, is the connection in Field's thought
between the psychological aftermath of the Commune and the hybrid-
ization of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment with the economic
tenets of laissez-faire. In what ways did Field's economic motivation
manifest itself ? What objectives did he pursue? Is there evidence that
he fostered or accelerated development of the doctrines of liberty to con-
tract and corporate personality? Were his contributions to these doctrines
indispensable? What is their ultimate bearing on Field's place in judicial
history?
II.
It is obvious that before these questions can be considered the consti-
tutional history of the post Civil War period must be briefly reviewed,
and Field's part therein critically examined. Historians have long puzzled
over the paradox that the biography of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
gins with an apparent death sentence and ends in near apotheosis. Phrase-
ology which today has come to be literally a bill of rights in itself, a con-
stitution within the Constitution, and a phenomenally efficient source of
judicial power originally received the narrowest possible reading and was
restricted in its practical application to "persons of the Negro Race." "
Widespread cynical opportunism in the use of the concepts was without
doubt an important factor in the sudden eclipse of due process and cor-
porate personality in the period 1871-73. Yet it is equally clear that Judge
Woods's substantial about-face in Continental Insurance Company v. New
Orleans 78 and Justice Miller's majority opinion in the Slaughtcr-House
Cases would both have been unlikely but for two textual flaws which had
sion in Thomson v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall. 576 (U. S. 1870) (holding the state-chartered,
federal-subsidized .Pacific Railroad to be taxable by the states).
77. See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 (U. S. 1873) (opinion by Justice
Miller, speaking primarily with reference to the equal protection clause). Paradoxically,
this clause was the first to be universally applied.
78. See note 51 supra.
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crept unnoticed into the framers' drafts in 1866. Radical Republicans had
warmed easily to the logic of Bingham's rudimentary equal protection-
due process-privileges or immunities clauses; they feared only that even
these three complementary guarantees might prove worthless if Demo-
crats regained control of Congress.7" Conservatives, on the other hand,
bitterly opposed any sweeping enlargement of Congressional power. To
achieve a constitutional rather than mere Congressional protection, there-
fore, and to placate opponents of unitary, centralized government, Bing-
ham shifted from his original positively-worded draft, "Congress shall
have power to make or enforce all laws necessary and proper," to the
present negative form, "no state shall make or enforce any law," and
in the fifth section gave Conigress power "to enforce the provisions of this
article by appropriate legislation." Whether, in making this shift, Bingham
uncritically regarded it as a clever compromise which gave Congress sub-
stantially the same powers as the original form, or whether he perceived
that in evading a showdown with critics, he had merely authorized Con-
gress to enforce a prohibition on the states, is not today apparent.
Textually, the effect was a drastic reduction.in the scope of Congressional
power and an attendant failure of the framers to consider further what
department of government should enforce the new guarantees.&O
The same excessive zeal for multiple protection responsible for this flaw,
had also made for another. Was it not a curious oversight, critics argued,
that the Amendment designed to clarify rights of citizenship nevertheless
failed to include any definition of the crucial word "citizen"? st Deeming
the point well taken, the Senate without extended debate 6_ added to the
joint Committee's draft the present introductory sentence: "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United
States and the state wherein they reside." No one observed, apparently,
that while citizenship was thus made dual in the first sentence, only the
privileges or immunities of "Citizens of the United States" were specific-
ally protected in the second sentence against abridgement by the states!
This oversight is, of course, easily explained. For years Bingham, and,
indeed, all Republican opponents of slavery and of the Dred Scott decision,
had assumed every important constitutional right to be a privilege or im-
munity of citizens of the United States. 3 Such had been the basic premise
79. See Graham, loc. cit. s.pra note 64; FLACrK, THE ADOn"oN OF THE Fournri?;rH
A=IENDMENT (1908) passim.
80. Flack concluded that Bingham ind other leading Radicals regarded the change as
having little effect on Congress' power-a conclusion difficult to accept until one per-
ceives how far natural rights ideology dominated the framers' thinking. Ibid.
81. Id. at 88. Senator Ben Wade of Ohio, an ultra-Radical, was chiefly responsible
for the change.
82. See CONG. GLoss, 39 Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 2869.
83. See Graham, supra note 64, at 400, n. 98.
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and the theory of the entire Amendment. They therefore could not con-
ceive-what nevertheless plainly was the case-that a sentence added to
clarify rights of citizenship, might, by its juxtaposition and inclusiveness,
have the contrary effect of obscuring and jeopardizing those rights. Like-
wise it escaped notice that an Amendment originally regarded as neces-
sary, and originally designed to broaden Congress's powers, ultimately
passed in a form which not only fell short of clear-cut enlargement, but
actually fell back on the very form which, in the cage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, had been regarded as ambiguous and inadequate.84
These defects came to light early in the Reconstruction era. They
figured in Democratic attacks 85 on the Radical program in Congress and
the courts. Yet it was not until early in 1871, in debates "" over the Ku
Klux Klan Act, that their potentialities were fully perceived. Ironically,
responsibility for emphasizing them rests with two of the ablest and
staunchest defenders of Negro rights, Senators Trumbull of Illinois and
Carpenter of Wisconsin. President Grant's message advocating a Second
Force Bill to cope with extra-legal suppression of Negro rights in the
South had raised a host of .troublesome questions. Had Congress the
power to deal with these matters, to hold, in short, that the Amendment
forbade denials of equal protection and abridgement of privileges by acts
either of omission or of commission? 87
Torrents of rhetoric and political casuistry sought to answer these ques-
tions, but an extempore exchange in the Senate between Trumbull and
Carpenter epitomized the debate and reveals the sources of both previous
and subsequent confusion. An idealist and ardent believer in Federalism,
who was as distressed at this time by the latitudinarianism of the vindic-
tives as he had earlier been at the cynical opportunism of the Confeder-
ates, Trumbull denied that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Con-
gress to protect citizens in their rights of person and property in the
states. Such an interpretation, he declared, would mean "annihilation of
the States." "The Fourteenth Amendment has not changed an iota of
84. Whether section two of the Thirteenth Amendment had granted Congress power
to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was one of the chief issues agitating Congress at the
time of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bingham himself contended that
further and unequivocal enlargement of Congressional power was essential. See ConG,
GLoBE, 39 Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 429, 1034, 1064-65, 1089-95, 1292.
85. See FLAcK, op. cit. supra note 79, c. 5, particularly at 221-22.
86. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871) 376-592 passimn. As originally
submitted the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, in the words of Trumbull, went to the extent
of punishing offenses against the states and undertook "to furnish redress for wrongs
done by one person upon another in the . ..states ... in violation of their laws." But
as passed by the House it went no further "than to protect persons in the rights . . .
guaranteed to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
87. This question had arisen a year earlier. See CONG. GLoBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1870) 3611 (remarks of Senator Pool).
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the Constitution. . . . The difference between the Senator and myself
is as to what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States. . . . National citizenship is one thing, and state citizenship is
another. . . . Before this amendment was adopted the same obligation
. . . rested upon the Government of the United States to protect citizens
of the United States, as now." 8s In short, the Fourteenth Amendment
was not remedial; it was simply declaratory-declaratory of what always
had been the real meaning of the Constitution. Thus it "added nothing,"
created no rights, merely recognized and restated the inalienable, univer-
sal, indestructible rights of man.
When he was later retained to argue the validity of the New Orleans
Slaughter-House monopoly before the United States Supreme Court,
Senator Carpenter made telling use of these views, the expression of which
he had previously prompted and criticized. It is no disparagement, indeed,
to say that Justice Miller's opinion in the Slaughter House Cases is largely
a re-synthesis of the arguments Senator Carpenter '1 derived from Trum-
bull. The heart and strength of both the arguments and opinion inhered
in a skillful emphasis on the dual character of the Union, the expediency
of maintaining the integrity of the police power and of declining to estab-
lish judicial censorship of state legislatures, and an uncanny capitalization
of the view that the Fourteenth Amendment had "added nothing" to the
Constitution. Basically it was the third point-the joint product of natur-
al rights thinking and of inability, to see (while judicial review was still
incompletely established) that the content of citizenship is actually what-
ever courts will enforce-that determined the entire result. Justice Miller's
Slaughter-House opinion-a never-ending source of amazement to his
admirers-moved majestically, almost irresistibly, from the Trumbull-
Carpenter premises to the practical absurdity that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment effected no fundamental change either in the content of national
citizenship or in the scope of Congressional power. It did so, of course,
because Miller and four colleagues were convinced that statesmanship
would be best served during Reconstruction by interpretations which up-
held the legislature's capacity to govern and which at the same time re-
stricted the discretionary powers of the courts." Accordingly, these Jus-
88. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871) 577. FLACe, op. cit. supra note 79,
at 225 et seq. summarizes the debates. The Carpenter-Trumbull exchange ¢ccurred on
April 11, 1871.
89. See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394, 399402 (U. S. 1873).
90. Interesting in light of the relations of Representative Bingham and Justice Miller
to the Fourteenth Amendment is the fact that these two statesmen toured the Pacific
Coast together in the same party in the summer of 1871, (DEXDY's Jo=.KAL, entry July
21, 1871, and Portland Oregonian, July 19, 1871) while Bingham was almost daily ex-
pounding his views of the Amendment's scope and purpose. See note 57 so pro. It hardly
seems possible, therefore, that Justice Miller was unfamiliar with the framers' views; yet
his reading of the Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases was certainly nut that as-
sumed by Bingham in 1866.
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tices freely exploited the flaws in one of the loftiest expressions of Ameri-
can idealism and foreshadowed the virtual emasculation of the amend-
ment as a bulwark of Negro rights.
The fact that Field, a states' rights Democrat who feared centraliza-
tion, led the attack on the self-denying majority decision written by the
Republican and nationalist Miller is further evidence of the intellectual
and political confusion of the post Civil War years. To Stephen Field,
his brethren's Slaughter-House opinion was an offense against both reason
and justice. It was not only bad law, but poor statesmanship: bad law,
because it reduced the Fourteenth Amendment to an absurdity, "a vain
and idle enactment which accomplished nothing," and the passage of
which "most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people" 91; and bad
statesmanship, because the Court construed its own powers so narrowly
as to threaten leaving the South at the mercy of Negroes and carpet-
baggers, and business, to the discretion of Grange-dominated legislatures.
To Field these consequences were equally fearful. Throughout the
seventies he stated and restated his convictions with a fervor that at times,
as in his opinion in Bartemeyer v. Iowa,0 in 1874, came close to exaspera-
tion and querulousness. He had no objection to--indeed concurred in-
later decisions 9' restricting Congress' powers under the amendment and
exploiting further the two flaws with reference to Negro rights, but lie
thoroughly deplored the Court majority's failure to expand the due
process and equal protection guarantees in order to make the Amend-
ment-and the Court-"a perpetual shield" against "hostile and dis-
criminating legislation." 4 In his dissenting opinions in the Granlgcr and
Sinking Fund cases he argued for the broadest possible substantive pro-
tection and criticized both decisions as blows to the security of corporate
rights. 5
What historians and biographers have overlooked is that by the mid-
seventies Justice Field was neither psychologically able nor judicially
willing merely to state these views in dissenting opinions. Even as early
91. 16 Wall. 36, 96 (U. S. 1873).
92. 18 Wall. 129, 137 (U. S. 1874).
93. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876) ; United States v. Harris,
106 U. S. 629 (1883) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883). Field even dissented from
the decisions in Ex parte Virginia and Coles, 100 U. S. 339, 349 (1880) ; Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1880), and other of the 1880 Civil Rights Cascs, assuming positions
which would have completely destroyed the Amendment as a source of protection for the
Negro Race.
94. Sinking Fund Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873). These phrases, and their cotun-
terparts, recurred in Field's opinions and at times were the articulate major premise.
95. Field's basic premise as stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 302 (1883) was
that ". . . all the guarantees of the Constitution designed to secure private rights, whether
of person or property, should be broadly and liberally interpreted so as to meet and pro-
tect against every form of oppression at which they were aimed, however disguised and
in whatever shape presented."
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as the Bartenzeyer decision, the tenor of a reference to his new chief, Mor-
rison R. Waite, suggested mounting dissatisfaction and maladjustment."'
Prolonged economic depression, unfortunate personal investments, the
failure of the Bank of California,"7 and the continual scandals of the
Grant administration, all added to his restlessness and anxiety. "God
help the country when the public service and public offices are thus de-
moralized-whither are we drifting?" he wrote in 1876. In swift suc-
cession there followed the strain of his service on the Electoral Commis-
sion " and the galling spectacle of President Hayes's inauguration.'"
96. Field to Deady, March 16, 1874: "That matter-the Chief Justiceship is at last
settled. We have a Chief Justice. He is a new man that would never have been thought
of for the position by any person except President Grant. He is a short thici: set per-
son, with very plain-indeed rough features. He is gentlemanly in his manners and
possesses some considerable culture. But how much of a lawyer he is remains to b2 seen.
He may turn out to be a Marshall or a Taney, though such a result is hardly to be ex-
pected. Mly objection to the appointment is that it is an experiment whether a man of
fair but not great abilities may make a fit Chief Justice of the United States-an ePxperi-
ment which no President has a right to make with our Court."
Interesting in this light is Circuit Judge Sawyer's report of a conversation he had had
with Field the previous summer: "Upon my suggestion that if (Attorney General] Wil-
liams should not be appointed and it should not be deemed expedient to elevate one of the
associate Justices to the position, the appointment ought to be made from those who had
already distinguished themselves on the bench of some other Court rather than from the
bar at large, or the mere politicians. He remarked that the Chief Justice ought to b, a
Statesman as well as a lawyer and few of them were sufficiently distinguished in that
line. I do not fully appreciate the force of the suggestion. He said the Chief Justice
would not be taken from the Justices of the Supreme Court." Sawyer to Deady, May 23,
1873.
97. "I have been very much down in mind and purse since my return fr, m Oregon.
The failure of the Bank of California affected in some degree almost every one. Even so
humble a person as myself has found great inconvenience following from it. My stocks
have so shrunk in consequence that an immediate sale would cause me great loss." Field
to Deady, September 26, 1875.
Judging by evidence in the Deady papers, Field suffered a high degree of loss in
many of his investments; mining stocks particularly proved disappointing. Field to Deady,
September 14, 1872, October 29, 1875. Late in life his straightened financial position and
meager estate caused him much anxiety and embarrassment. Field to Deady, November
10. 1885, April 24, 1890, December 6, 1890.
98. Field to Deady, April 2, 1876. The passage begins: "There is nothing new here.
The very air is heavy with scandals unearthed, and rumors of greater scandals yet to be
exposed."
99. See SwisHER, op. cit. supra note 2, c. 10; DoYIE, The Electoral Colmnssion of
1877 in SOME ACCOUNT OF THE WOaK OF STEPHEN J. FELD (1881) 411. "The decision
of the Commission, not to enquire into the correctness of the action of the Camassing
Boards of Louisiana and Florida was a great shock to the Country. It is the first time, I
believe, that it has ever been held by any respectable body of jurists, that a fraud was
protected from exposure by a certificate of its authors. I shall have much to say to you
during the summer of the proceedings before that Tribunal and of its action." Field to
Deady, April 2, 1877.
100. Following the passage quoted in note 99 supra, Field continued: "The President,
who owes his seat to the success of a gigantic conspiracy and fraud, is not finding his
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And while overwrought and embittered at these events Field had to face
the long-delayed decisions in the Granger Cases and the great Railroad
Strike of 1877.101 Inevitably, his relations with colleagues and subordin-
ates suffered. Great patience and firmness were required of Chief Justice
Waite in resisting Field's efforts to gain assignment of the opinion in a
Pacific Railroad case10 2 that involved the obligations of his friends, Stan-
ford and Huntington. Throughout the Hayes administration Field confid-
ed details which left friends with an unfavorable opinion of Justice Brad-
ley's decisive role as a member of the Electoral Commission.103  -Iow
irascible and domineering he eventually became in relations with the sub-
ordinate judges of his circuit is evident in his remark: "It is not pleasant
to find the moment one leaves the State that all the spirit and courage
ooze out from the Federal judges in San Francisco." 101
place a bed of roses. It is right that it should be so. He is evidently a very weak man,
and hardly knows what to do. He perceives very clearly, for that has been dinned into
his ears, that he and Packard [Governor of Louisiana] are twins of the same birth, and
that he cannot well proclaim Packard a bastard, without impeaching his own legitimacy.
And yet the people will not stand much longer bayonet rule in Louisiana. The vile
wretches, who have fattened on the life-blood of that state, must be driven from their
places, and its people be allowed to govern themselves, like the people of other States.
What a commentary it is upon the utter demoralization of the public mind, that it can be
supposed for a moment that a Governor of a State requires, for the legitimacy of his
authority, the recognition of the President I He has no more to do with the matter than
he has with the conduct of my family." Ibid.
101. The Granger Cases were finally decided March 1, 1877; the great Railroad Strike
occurred in July, 1877.
102. United States v. Union Pacific R. R., 91 U. S. 72 (1875) (opinion by Jus-
tice Davis). Apparently Field had been refused the assignment because of his well-known
friendship with the California railroad promoters, and because his dissatisfaction with the
Government's argument might "unconsciously . . . find expression in your opinion,
Once in, it would be difficult to get it out." Waite to Field, November 10, 1875, quoted
in TRIMBLE, CHIEF JUsTIcE WAITE: DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1938) 262.
103. Several entries in Deady's Journal mention "long talks with Field" regarding the
Electoral Commission and other matters, and on August 31, 1878, Deady observed that
Field's "account of what passed between him [Field] and Bradley, when he chose the lat-
ter for the Fifth Judge on the electoral commission . .. does not redound to Bradley's
credit, but the contrary." No details were given, but it was currently charged that Brad-
ley had yielded to partisan influence. DEADY'S JOURNAL, entry August 31, 1878,
See NEviNs, ABRA,'T S. HEwrTr, WIrH SOmE ACCOUNT OF PETER CooPER (1935)
305-400, for apparent confirmation, though judgment on this point may be suspended
until publication of Charles Fairman's life of Bradley, based on the Justice's personal
papers.
104. Field to Deady, April 3, 1890, with reference to his subordinates' indifference to
his requests in matters growing out of the Sharon-Hill divorce and will cases, Paren-
thetically, it may be said that strain and excitement of this prolonged litigation burdened
Justice Field's later years. His confidential correspondence must necessarily be read with
regard for the personalities and conduct of the Terrys. See SwxsuER, op. cit. supra note
2, c. 13; 15 AMERI AN STATE TRIALs (Lawson ed. 1926) 465. Yet his prejudices were
apparent from the beginning, Field to Deady, Aug. 25, 1885, Sept. 5, 1885, and the an-
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Judicial reserve, therefore, was in time overbalanced by restlessness,
ambition and anxiety. During the seventies and eighties Field maneuver-
ed to reverse the trend of judicial decision. unsuccessfully at first by spon-
soring a proposal whereby membership of the Supreme Court would he
increased to twenty-one; later, by the more fruitful expedient of making
his dissenting opinions on the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment the
constitutional law of the Ninth Circuit.
By one of the strangest paradoxes in American history, the means which
President Roosevelt later would have used to eradicate laisseT-fairc from
the Constitution was originally conceived and sponsored by Justice Field
as a device to assure its development. Burdened with more arduous cir-
cuit duties than his colleagues and convinced that some means had to be
found to expedite the vastly increased business of the federal judici-
ary,0  Field in the late sixties or early seventies became the advocate of
a functionalized Supreme Court.""0 Enlarged to twenty-one members, the
tagonisms aroused and rekindled by the cases soon transformed him into a heated par-
tisan of the Sharons. See Field to Deady, Feb. 2, 18, Sept 13, 188, May 25, 18S9,
July 23, 1889, Nov. 5, 1889, April 24, 1890. Field's ablest colleagues at circuit, Deady
and Sawyer, were themselves men of strong will and character, who, while sharing many
of Field's social views, occasionally resented dictation and interference. "If as Field wrote
and telegraphed us we are bound to follow him till reversed by the Supreme C4,urt al-
though every other Judge in the Circuit disagrees with him, then that Court ought to
decide the question between us, when it gets the question regularly before it and thus
relieve us for our exceedingly embarrassing and disagreeable position." Sawyer to Deady,
Nov. 9, 1884.
105. Field's proposals for reform of the judiciary must be viewed in the light of tlhe
burdens under which he and his colleagues labored until Congress at last passed the Act
of March 3, 1891, creating the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. 26 S,',T. 8_-6
(1891). For an excellent survey of the expansion of the Court's docket and the numerous
proposals and attempts made to secure relief, see FMIANKFURTER AND Li;vs, THE Busi-
NESS OF THE SUPREMIE COURT (1927) c. 2 passin. Many members of the bar and judiciary
advocated similar or competing plans. Id. at 69-102. See also Reports of 1he Committees
on Relief of the United States Courts (1883) 5 A. B. A. Rnr. 343-06.
Field seems to have been the only member of the Court who actively favored its en-
largement; Justice Miller favored relief by curtailment of appellate jurisdiction; former
Justice Davis worked zealously for creation of circuit courts of appeals. Functitnaliza-
tion (but not enlargement) of the Court was advocated in (1375) 9 A. L REV. 03.
Circuit Judge Sawyer sponsored a hybrid plan which called for enlargement of the Su-
preme Court to eighteen, with the same Justices sitting from time to time as a Nativnal
Court of Appeals. See (1883) 5 A. B. A. REp. 348.
106. Field outlined his views on judicial reorganization in several letters to Deady.
On March 16, 1874, immediately following the passage quoted in nQte 96 supra, re-
lating his unfavorable impression of Chief Justice Waite, he wrote:
"Our Court has disposed of an unusually large number of cases this year and before
we adjourn shall probably dispose of one hundred and fifty more. But there must be some
radical change in our Court before the business, which is increasing every year can b2
disposed of each term. I believe I explained to you my ideas on the subject some years
ago. I would have twenty-one judges, divided into three Sections of seven each and
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new Court would have sat in three sections after the manner of the con-
tinental Courts of Cassation. The stressed advantage of this reform was
that under it closely contested and constitutional cases could be decided by
the full Court while all others could be expedited through an appropriate
section. How far original sponsorship of the plan was determined by
political considerations is not clear.107 Yet it is evident that hopes of re-
versing majority holdings eventually colored the entire scheme. Begin-
ning in the late seventies, they combined to push Field deeper and deeper
assign to one Section the admiralty, patent and revenue cases, to another Section the
Equity cases, and to the third Section all other cases. If a constitutional question had to
be decided before the case could be disposed of, and there was any difference of opinion
among the Judges of the Section considering the case, I would have it referred to the
full number for decision. By this system we could have the equivalent of three Courts
of last resort, between which there would be no clashing decisions, as a different class of
cases would be assigned to each Section." Field to Deady, March 16, 1874.
On October 23, 1877, he stated: "The Court has got fairly at work, but with a cal-
endar so great as to take away all hope of disposing of it for years. I don't think that
the country will long stand the present organization of the Federal Courts. Some more
efficient system must be devised for the disposition of their business particularly in the
Supreme Court. The system I outlined to you when in Oregon, of providing different
Sections for the disposition of different classes of business is growing more and more
into favor every day. But I don't think anything will be done this present session-
meaning by that the extra and regular session together. I am inclined to think that the
coming winter will be devoted by Congress principally to financial measures, and meas-
ures for preventing frauds in Presidential Elections. The country is pretty well dis-
gusted with the tricks of the politicians, and is determined to have no more of such scan-
dalous transactions as disgraced the last election. Such scenes could not take 'place again
without a civil war." Field to Deady, October 23, 1877.
107. Possibly Field's interest in the functionalized Court dated from his European
tour or was stimulated by his brother David Dudley's knowledge of continental legal
systems. An enlarged court of eighteen modeled on the French Court of Cassation, had
been advocated by Senator Thurman in Senatorial debate in 1869. See CoNG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1870) 210.
It will be observed that in the first recorded reference to the proposal in 1874 Field
recalled having outlined his ideas on the subject "some years ago." Subsequent refer-
ences likewise indicate persistent and zealous advocacy. Sponsorship apparently tapered
off and finally ceased after the Court began to adopt the Fieldian interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In 1885, the Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Post
Dispatch, reporting Field's contemplated retirement in 1888 on completion of twenty-five
years' service, declared that Field "hopes to secure, before he retires, an increase in the
number of Justices. . . . He believes in raising the number . . . to fourteen, with a
quorum of six. . . .He has already talked with the President upon the subject, and has
asked him to recommend such legislation to Congress." See San Francisco Morning Call,
May 10, 1885, reprinting the dispatch dated April 29, 1885.
So far as the writer is aware this was the only occasion in which Field's name was
publicly linked with the proposal; and no later sponsorship, either public or private, has
been found. On January 26, 1880, a bill incorporating the chief features of the plan
was introduced in the House by Representative Manning of Mississippi. It was indorsed
in principle by a minority of the American Bar Association Committee in 1882. See
(1883) 5 A. B. A. REr. 363.
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into Presidential politics.1 0 s Ill-concealed dislike for President Hayes,
mounting agrarian and labor unrest, particularly in California, praise
for his dissenting opinions by business leaders who also saw merit in the
Court plan, natural enthusiasm for his candidacy in the South-these
factors made it inevitable that he sanction use of his name for the Demo-
cratic nomination. After hurried efforts of friends and brothers failed
at Cincinnati in 1880, systematic preparations were laid for the campaign
four years later."0 9
But the forces which had propelled Field's candidacy ultimately sabo-
taged it. Aroused and embittered at circuit decisions which had blocked
attempts to secure an economically fair assessment of the property of
the Southern and Central Pacific Railroads owned by Stanford and Hunt-
ington,"x0 California agrarians and workingmen inserted a plank in the
democratic state platform of 1884 "expressly repudiating the Presidential
108. "You say that my name is being mentioned in connection with the presidency. I
suppose you smiled at that, as I have; and would probably smile more if I should be
generally taken up as a candidate. But there is little probability of that-not one chance
in a thousand. Therefore, I do not give any thoughts to the subject, nor allow it to
distract my sleep or trouble my digestion. Seriously, I would not give up the indepen-
dence of thought and action I enjoy for the presidency for life." Field to Deady, fay
31, 1879 (shortly after his dissenting opinion in the Sinsing Fund Cas first inspired
serious talk of his candidacy).
"Justice Field is largely occupied (entre nous) in putting the wires in order for the
next Democratic National Convention to nominate a candidate for President. He is not
without hopes and is doing his level best in that direction." Sawyer to Deady, September
18, 1879.
"Judge Field's 'Boom' seems to be booming quite finely just now. He is beginning
to write letters on the Chinese. See Letter to General Miller in today's Call" Sawyer
to Deady, March 22, 1880, alluding to an open letter wherein Field had clarified his views
of Chinese immigration.
109. Field was philosophical at defeat in 18S0: "You see, by the result of the Cin-
cinnati Convention, that I am to be left in peace this summer-not badgered nor fretted,
not abused nor villified, not shown to have been guilty of all the crimes on earth for which
I have been or ought to have been punished-in other words, I am to be permitted to
maintain during the year some little of a civilized and christian character.
Mly candidacy for the Presidency has been but an episode in my quiet life and will soon
be forgotten. I shall remain as a good soldier at my post." Field to Deady, July 10, 1SO.
Yet friends were amused that he should still circulate his unpublished recollections.
"They will be ready for the campaign of '84." Sawyer to Deady, Aug. 2, 1880. "Field
showed me a sketch of his life and an analysis of his leading opinions by Pomeroy . . .
and wanted me to look it over and tell him what I think of the propriety of publishing
it. . . . Talked at some length and with some feeling of the mean way the railway peo-
ple of Cal. had used him about the Democratic nomination in 18 .... " DvIMY's Jour,-
xEAL, entry Dec. 28, 1881. See also Field to Pomeroy, June 21, 1831, published in Graham,
Four Letters of Mr. Justice Field (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1100.
"Field still dreams of the Presidency and may yet attain it." Dz=nv's JoumzAL.,
entry Sept. 22, 1883.
110. See SwisnER, op. cit. stipra note 2, c. 12.
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aspirations of Stephen J. Field." "' This blow, falling, as it did, on the
eve of the national convention, made a jest of Field's candidacy and inflict-
ed wounds which never healed. Its full impact, however, was not felt
until some months later when diatribes against "communist" and "ag-
rarian" "2 enemies further betrayed the subconscious sources of Field's
anxiety. Yet distress mingled with bewilderment and resentment was
manifest in a letter which disclosed to John Norton Pomeroy the hopes
which had motivated the entire venture:
I shall have much to say to you when we meet; particularly of the
very strange action of California. Had I received the cordial sup-
port, instead of the opposition of that State, my candidacy . . .
would have stood great chances of success....
I had, of course, some ambition to carry out certain measures
which I believed would be of great advantage to the country. Par-
ticularly did I desire a reorganization of the Federal Judiciary. As
now constituted it fails of the purpose of its creation. The Supreme
Court is three years behind in its regular business, and its docket
is increasing so rapidly that it will soon be four years, and more,
before a case can be reached after it is docketed. Could I have been
instrumental in reorganizing theFederal Judiciary I would have
placed on the Bench able and conservative men and thus have
brought back the decisions of the Court to that line from which they
should not have departed and thus, as I believe, have contributed
something towards strengthening and perpetuating our institu-
tions.
1 13
111. Apparently Field's initial reaction was a greater consciousness of his social sym-
pathies. "The wealthy and comfortable wonder . . . at the grumblings of the needy and
are measuring the eye of the needle which the camels of old had some difficulty in squeez-
ing through, to see what chance there is for their passage. They are not so confident of
the 'good time' hereafter as they are of the condition of their bank account now. I am
on the other side and would give the underfellow a show in this life. It is a shame to
put him off to the next world." Field to Deady, Oct. 29, 1884. But later, after the mag-
nitude of the humiliation at Stockton became clearer, and California supporters sought
aid in the bitter fight to control local patronage, his tone changed. "I have not hesitated
to explain the true situation of things in California to the President and Heads of De-
partments who have inquired of me respecting it. I have let them understand that the
question was not whether A or B should have a particular place but whether the men
of order and law, men who believed in the great institutions of society should have the
ascendancy in the State, or whether the outcome of the sandlot, and the agrarian and
nihilistic element should control. Having stated that the real contest was between civili-
zation on the one-hand and anarchy on the other I have left the matter to those who may
feel disposed to aid either the one side or the other." Field to Deady, April 8, 1885.
112. See the letters quoted in SWisnza, op. cit. supra note 2, 314-16; and Field to
Deady, May 17, 1886.
113. Field to Pomeroy, July 28, 1884, published in Graham, supra note 109, at 1107-08.
Field's political naivet6 and his handicaps of temperament and position were also strik-
ingly revealed in the letter written to Deady, July 16, 1884:
"My name was not presented by my friends, who thought it would be unwise, so
long as the strength of Cleveland remained unbroken. Had that ever been broken, my
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Coincident with Justice Field's campaigns for the Presidency-and for
an enlarged reconstituted Court-was another campaign, still less pub-
licized and understood, which ultimately proved of greater significance.
This was the development, in a series of major circuit opinions, of what
subsequently came to be attacked as "the Ninth Circuit law." "I
name would have been brought before the Convention, and according to the statement
of my friends, with a reasonable prospect of success.
"The action of the Stockton convention, in California did me much harm with pali-
ticians; for it seems to be an established rule with them, that a candidate must have the
support of his own state before he can expect the support of a National Convention. The
rule is a very unwise one; for the acts and measures which may render him popular out-
side of his own state, may render him unpopular there. But aside from politicians, with
the thinking men throughout the country, the action of the Stockton convention did me
no harm, but rather called forth tributes of regard and appreciation greater than I had
ever received before.
"I am well contented with the result. Indeed, had my wishes been consulted, my
name would never have been used. In my present sphere I may do some good, and after
all position is only desirable as a means of doing good:' Field to Deady, July 16, 1884.
See also the statement printed in San Francisco Alta, June 18, 1884, and quoted in
SWiSHER, op. cit. sitpra note 2, at 308-09.
114. "Certain mischievous tendencies are observable in the Federal courts, which the
scheme of reporting circuit court decisions according to circuits is calculated to promote.
We allude to what is called the 'law of the circuit.' Certain judges, for instance . . .
have certain ideas upon certain questions. It may be the circuit justice; it may be the cir-
cuit judge. More likely it is both together. They impress these ideas . . . upon their
subordinates . . . and these ideas become, until reversed, what is termed 'the law', of the
circuit.' These ideas very often relate to questions which, from their nature, can not get
to the Supreme Court,--such as questions arising in criminal prosecutions and under the
writ of habeas corpus. . . [The judges) in the Ninth Circuit . . . have certain ideas
[which] . . . are alluded to as 'the law of the Ninth Circuit.' The leading characteristic
of this new law is an unwarrantable enlargement of Federal jurisdiction, the erection of a
general and irresponsible superintendency over the police regulations of the States, over
their process of interstate extradition, and over the administration of their criminal laws.
It is quite time that this matter were checked.' Thompson, Book Review (1834) IS An.
L. REv. 535-36. See Thompson, Abuses of the Writ of Habeas Corpus (IM) 18 An.
L. REv. 1-23, Practice in Cases of Extradition (18,3) 17 At. L. RE%. 315-49, (1883)
17 Am. L. REv. 997-1000, (1884) IS Am. L. REv. 136-38, 145-47, 294-S5, 321-2,
327-28, 690-92, 891-94, 1030-31, 1062-64.
Thompson argued that the objection was not so much to what the judges had de-
cided in these cases as to the fact that they had exercised jurisdiction at all. By passing
on the validity of state laws and provisions of state constitutions, the federal and dis-
trict judges had assumed, he maintained, a final appellate jurisdiction over the courts
of the state, without reference to their rank or authority. See Thompson, supra, 18 An.
L. REv. 1-23.
Thompson's campaign was thus waged chiefly with reference to the jurisdictional
rather than constitutional phases of the decisions, yet he stressed the great importance
of the constitutional questions in Parrott's Chinese case. See note 128 infra.
Largely in response to his agitation in the American Law Reziew, and before the
American Bar Association Conventions of 1883 and 1884, Congress finally passed the Act
of March 3, 1885, restoring appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in habeas cor-
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Long before Field's time, determined justices, dissatisfied with col-
leagues' decisions, had sought by well-phrased dicta to gain recognition
and eventual acceptance for their minority views. I-ow far the dissenter
would go in these directions was of course determined by his self-re-
straint and his respect for the majority's holdings. In actual practice,
by taking advantage of cases in which decisions of the circuit courts were
final,115 it was quite possible for a strong-willed dissenter to ignore and
occasionally undermine majority decisions by establishing his minority
pus cases. Sawyer's and Deady's opinions, especially those cited hereafter, appear to
have contributed heavily to the result. See Report of the House Judiciary Comninittee,
48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1885); H. R. REP. No. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1885).
Insofar as criticism directed against the circuit law was based on abuse of the writ
of habeas corpus, it appears to the writer that Judge Thompson ignored-perhaps for
tactical reasons-the degree to which such factors as the statutory extension of habeas
corpus during Reconstruction, the broad wording of section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the implication of the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution
combined to work revolutionary changes in the use and effect of any ancient common
law writ--combined to make it, potentially-and at times in practice-the writ of error
it had never been intended to be. Yet this does not preclude criticism of the manner in
which Sawyer and Deady, with Field's encouragement, chose to exercise an exceedingly
delicate jurisdiction. In such cases as In re Ah Lee, 5 Fed. Cas. 899 (D. Ore. 1880);
and In re Lee Tong, 18 Fed. 253 (D. Ore. 1883), Deady (in Thompson's phrase) proceeded
almost as if section 753 of the Revised Statutes were "a ram in the judicial fleet by which
a single judge might cut the processes of the State courts in two amidships." And it
would appear that the extraordinary dicta of the former opinion, as well as the severely
criticized holdings of the latter, originated from a desire to embroider the Fourteenth
Amendment.
When at length in Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624 (1884), the Supreme Court
[unanimously overruling Sawyer in In re Robb, 19 Fed. 26 (D. Cal. 1884)] held the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts to be concurrent rather than exclusive,
thus partially clipping the circuit judges' wings, Judge Sawyer declared himself "morti-
fied and astonished," especially that Justices Field and Matthews had concurred in the
decision. To the sympathetic Deady he confided that both Justices had expressed their
approval (in advance) of a draft of his circuit opinion-Field declaring emphatically that
"in any conflict (the state] court must go to the wall." "So it is now settled," Sawyer
added philosophically, "that we judges on this coast have been 'elevating our horns' a
little too high of late, and we must take them down.' Sawyer to Deady, May 21, 1884.
It is only fair to say that federal-state issues in the Robb case were presented in such
scrambled form that first-rate minds might easily have been confused. Yet one wonders,
in retrospect, if the harvest was not partially of the Ninth Circuit judges' own sowing.
For a merciless probing of the difficulty of confining the writ of habeas coipus to
purely jurisdictional matters, and the virtual necessity of permitting its use in certain
instances as the equivalent of a writ of error, see In re Bell, 19 Cal. 488 (Cal. 1942).
115. Notably habeas corpus cases, see note 118 infra; criminal prosecutions, see REv.
STAT. § 697 (1815) ; FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUsINEss or THlE SUPREME COURT
(1928) 79, n. 107; and suits in circuit courts involving less than $5000, see Rav. STAT.
§ 691-92 (1875) ; FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, supra at 87-88. Prior to the Act of Feb.
16, 1875, 18 STAT. 316 (1875), decrees of the circuit courts had been final only in cases
involving less than $2000.
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views as the law of his own circuit."1 ' Such occasional applications, how-
ever, appear to have had little or no constitutional significance until after
1868. In that year, to forestall an adverse decision on the constitutionality
of the Reconstruction Acts,"17 a Radical-dominated Congress summarily
withdrew the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in all habeas corpus
cases."' The practical and unforeseen result, of course, was to increase
tremendously the freedom and discretion of the circuit Justices and their
subordinates in dealing with the momentous political and economic issues
of Reconstruction whenever these issues were raised in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings."o
In this manner it developed that in the summer of 1874, shortly after
his slighting reference to Chief justice Waite 10 and after his vehement,
almost querulous, opinion in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, Justice Field journeyed
to San Francisco and there heard the habeas corpus case of The TwZenty-
One Chinese Prostitutes. 1
2
Concluding a remarkable opinion, which already had invalidated as
an infringement of treaty rights and exclusive Congressional power a
California statute the purpose of which had obviously been to choke off
Chinese immigration by authorizing an inspector to bar "all lunatic, idi-
otic. . . , crippled . . . , lewd and debauched" persons, Field declared
that inasmuch as the equal protection clause applied to all "persons" rather
than "citizens," the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment as well.
Since the point was judicially redundant,' 2- it may be inferred that the
postscriptum was added principally to make Field's Slaughtcr-House and
Bartenzeyer dissenting opinions on the scope of section one the consti-
tutional law of the ninth circuit.'1
23
116. This is reputed to have been the result in Justice Nelson's circuit in the
sixties with regard to foreign extradition proceedings. Compare Ex parte Kaine, 14 How.
103 (U. S. 1852) with Ex parte Kaine, 14 Fed. Cas. 78 (S. D. N. Y. 1853). See In re
Henrich, 11 Fed. Cas. 1143 (S. D. N. Y. 1867) ; In re Farez, 8 Fed. Cas. 107 (S. D.
N. Y. 1870). See also Thompson, Practice in Cases of Foreign Extradition (18I3) 17
Am. L. REv. 315-49, 322.
117. See Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 31S (U. S. 1863), 7 Wall. 506 (U. S. 186).
See also SwisHm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 158-63; 2 Browm ro, Drny (1925) 191-92.
118. Act of March 27, 1868, 15 STAT. 44, §2 (1M6S), repealing relevant parts of Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, 14 STAT. 385 (1867).
119. See note 114 supra.
120. See note 96 supra.
121. See In re Ah Fong, 1 Fed. Cas. 213 (D. Cal. 1874). See also Swissn, op. cit.
supra note 2, c. 8, 211-16.
122. It is difficult to see by what line of reasoning the equal protection clause can be
applied to aliens seeking admission to the United States; for the clause reads: "Nor
shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." (italics added). Logically, the Court's decision was necessary to place the Chinese
women "within the jurisdiction" of California.
123. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Field wrote no concurring opinion
expressing his view that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment when the Su-
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However this may have been, the Ninth Circuit law flourished in pro-
portion to the reverses its doctrines suffered in the Supreme Court of the
United States. In the summer of 1879, after the majority's disappointing
decisions in the Granger and Sinking Fund 124 cases, and while California
conservatives were aghast at the regulatory agencies created by their new
state constitution, Field reaffirmed and elaborated his earlier dictum. The
equal protection clause, he declared in the famous Queue case, 12  applied
to "all persons . . native or foreign, high or low"; it even shielded
Chinese petty offenders from a San Francisco ordinance designed to col-
lect cash fines under pain of clipping off queues; its implied equality of
preme Court of the United States, on writ of error to the Supreme Court of California,
unanimously invalidated the statute in Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275 (1876). To
have done so would have emphasized the minority character of his views and might
have evoked unfavorable comment on use of the equal protection clause in cases where
the question before the Court was the power of the state to exclude.
124. Union Pacific R. R. v. United States, 99 U. S. 700 (1878) (Justices Strong,
Bradley, and Field dissenting). Field's dissent, id. at 750, is of special interest viewed In
relation to his Presidential aspirations and his friendship with the Central Pacific pro-
moters. Bitterly denouncing interference with a state-chartered corporation, lie argued
for extension of judicial review to the point of making the "spirit of the contract clause"
a limitation on Congress' powers (which in this instance had been exercised to compel
a recalcitrant and mismanaged enterprise to safeguard the Government's equity).
125. Ho Ali Kow v. Nunan, 12 Fed. Cas. 252 (D. Cal. 1879). See SwisiTER, op. cil.
supra note 2, at 216-20, SomIE ACCOUNT OF THE WORK OF STEPHEN J. FIELD (1881)
394-98, for the background of this interesting case. Here again, the important point is
not that Field invalidated a discreditable statute or ordinance, but rather the manner in
which he rephrased dicta with an eye to emerging issues. In the Prostitute case lie had
said merely that "equality of protection implies . . . equal accessibility to the Courts for
the prevention or redress of wrongs and the enforcement of iights!' Now, pressing
for judicial recognition of the concept of freedom of contract, see note 124 supra, lie sub-
stituted "for the prevention or redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts"
and laid stress on the point that "all the instrumentalities and agencies" of state gov-
ernment were thus inhibited. (italics added).
It is also interesting to note that this appears to have been one of the few instances
in which Field exercised his privilege of writing the opinion in a case handled at circuit
largely by his subordinates. "Justice Field prefaced his remarks with the statement that
the papers in the case were transmitted to him some time ago by Judge Sawyer [who
had handled the routine matters] but he did not have time to examine the matter until
the recess of the Supreme Court." San Francisco Evening Bulletin, July 7, 1879. San
Francisco papers had apparently expected Judge Sawyer to hand down the decision. See
San Francisco Chronicle, July 8, 1879. The fact that judicial relief almost of necessity
at this date usually tended in opposite directions testifies to Field's extraordinary interest.
It should be added that while not jurisdictionally grounded on habeas corpus Field's deci-
sion in the Queue case proved to be final-whether from statutory reasons or merely
from failure of Nunan to appeal, the incomplete record fails to show. It is hard to be-
lieve that the Supreme Court would not have upheld Field, though one wonders, on the
basis of Justice Miller's complaint in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877),
whether the majority would have relished the advertising, either of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or the minority views on the scope of the equal protection clause.
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protection, moreover, embraced protection for the enforcement of con-
tracts; its inhibitions extended to "all the instrumentalities and agencies"
of state government.
As a persecuted racial minority whose treaty rights of residence and
employment were repeatedly violated in western states, Chinese aliens
thus succeeded in advancing, in a purely humanitarian context, the very
interpretations of the key words "person," "liberty," property," "due
process," and "equal protection" which corporation lawyers had suught
in vain. 12 16 Moreover, subordinate judges who originally had been amazed
at Field's audacity and had declined to concur in his views in the Pros-
titute case,127 now zealously followed his lead. In habeas corpus proceed-
ings early in 1880,128 Circuit Judge Sawyer and District Judge Hoffman
invalidated the newly-enforced provision of the California Constitution of
1879 which prohibited corporations from employing Chinese."'9 Such a
126. Compare, for example, the arguments in the various Granei'r cases, in state as
well as Federal courts.
127. "Judge Hoffman said he entirely concurred in the opinion of Judge Sawyer that
neither the treaty with China, the 14th Amendment, nor any law of Congress passed in
pursuance of it, had any bearing on the question before the Court." San Francisco Alta,
Sept. 22, 1874. See also San Francisco Evening Bulletin, Sept. 22, 1874; Bncoi~s, BniEr
ToUCHING THE CHINESE QUESTION (1877) 50-51.
On Oct. 16, 1874, Sawyer wrote to Deady: "Mr. Justice Field in my judgment over-
ruled United States v. Mfiln & the Passenger Cases in his recent decision in Lewd Women
case. It is true the exact point was not absolutely necessary in judgment in these cases,
but the grounds upon which the first was put and the solemnly expressed opinions of the
judges in the other cases cannot with any sort of propriety be called mere dicta. And I
see no reason for distinguishing 'moral' from 'physical pestilence.'" Sawyer to Deady,
Oct. 16, 1874.
If, as his reference to "the other cases" seems to indicate, Judge Sawyer referred to the
Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (U. S. 1849), he apparently was confused by the multiplicity
of opinions, for a bare majority of the Court therein invalidafed the statutes, although nine
separate opinions were written, and Taney, Daniel, Nelson, and Woodbury dissented.
128. See In re Tribucio Parrott, 1 Fed. 481 (D. Cal. 1880). See also In re Ah
Chong, 2 Fed. 733 (D. Cal. 1880), wherein Sawyer in habeas corpus proceedings held void
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and treaty rights a California statute pro-
hibiting all aliens incapable of becoming electors of the state from fishing in California
waters.
129. A statute passed February 13, 1880 (Cal. Acts Amend. of the Codes, 1S0,
Penal § 178) in enforcement of Art. XIX, § 2 of California Constitution of 1879 made an
officer of any corporation employing Chinese guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by fine
and imprisonment, and provided that for a second offense the corporation should lose its
charter. Parrott, president of a mine that employed 200 Chinese aliens, was arrested and
convicted in a San Francisco police court February 21. His attorneys thereupon peti-
tioned the United States circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus and elaborate argu-
ments were made.
Sawyer had confided in a marginal note to Deady, February 15, 180, "Yesterday
both houses rushed through the anti-Chinese bill prohibiting corporations to employ them.
Read three times in house on same day and the Governor hastened to sign it on same
day before the ink's dry. I shall have it before long when Baker will come into play."
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provision, the judges held, invaded the economic rights of both employers
and employed. Due process and equal protection embraced the right to
pursue lawful callings. Although the Court was apparently unwilling in
the face of the decision in Continental Insurance Company v. New Orleans
to hold with counsel 130 that corporations were "persons" within the mean-
ing of section one, Judge Sawyer virtually made the Slaughter-House
dissents the law of the Ninth Circuit,131 and his confidential remarks 132
suggest that he was aware of the effect of his opinion.
The psychological and doctrinal significance of these Chinese cases is
at once apparent. The very' establishment and extension of the "Ninth
Circuit law" are corroborative evidence of Field's determination to bol-
ster the constitutional position of property. Moreover, the doctrines thus
developed were the doctrines which had suffered implicit-though not
explicit-rejection by the majority of the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-
House and Granger cases. Assertion-either by dictum or otherwise-
of a constitutional right to pursue lawful callings, to make and enforce
contracts, and to conduct one's business free from extraordinary legis-
lative demands had been prudently avoided by the majority before 1880,
The later results were, therefore, anomalies which lawyers could exploit
"Baker" was of course Baker v. Portland, 2 Fed. Cas. 472 (D. Ore. 1879), wherein
Deady, in a decision later affirmed by Field, had voided (as an infringement of the implied
treaty right to labor in self support) an Oregon statute of 1872 prohibiting the employ-
ment of alien Chinese on public works. See also Deady's earlier opinion in Chapman v.
Toy Long, 5 Fed. Cas. 496 (C. C. Ore. 1876).
130. The leading argument on corporate personality was made by Delos Lake, an inti-
mate friend of Field and Sawyer, who was also counsel for the Central Pacific Railroad,
See summaries in San Francisco Morning Call, March 7, 1880; Sacramento Record
Union, March 8, 1880.
Obviously by 1879-80, the question of whether corporations were to gain benefits
under the Fourteenth Amedment was one which could no longer be ignored on the
Pacific Coast.
131. Note that Sawyer quotes Judge Swayne's dissenting opinion, Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 127 (1872) to the effect that "property" signifies everything which
has "exchangeable value." Cf. CoMMAioNs, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISAM (1924)
c.2.
132. An entry in Deady's Journal, dated April 10, 1880, reads:
"Got the opinions this morning of Sawyer and Hoffman in Parrott's case and read
them. Hoffman does not notice my opinions in Chapman v. Toy Long and Baker v.
Portland which surprises me. It was certainly not magnanimous or kind. Sawyer doe-
but mincingly-I won't say grudgingly-Baker v. Portland. I had a letter from him with
the opinions in which he speaks of having used my 'wedge' with his little mallet as well
as he could."
The letter mentioned by Deady is missing in the files, but apparently the "wedge"
was Deady's doctrine of the implied treaty right to labor in self-support, while the
"mallet," which Sawyer now willingly claimed as his own, notwithstanding his original
views in the Prostitute case, was the doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
teed to both Chinese and mine owners the right to acquire and enjoy property free from
extraordinary legislative demands.
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to the utmost. Chinese aliens on the Pacific coast had rights superior to
American citizens in Louisiana. The Chinese were secure in their con-
stitutional right to work in a quicksilver mine; yet New Orleans butchers
were not similarly free to pursue their hallowed calling. A California
mining corporation might hire and fire as it pleased, despite legislation
to the contrary; yet a midwestern railroad or a New York insurance com-
pany was required to submit to ceaseless legislative exactions. Ever ready
to capitalize on such anomalies, and to reason by processes of logical ex-
tension, lawyers at last had powerful leverage in their fight to overturn
Continental Insurance Coinpan v. Newz Orleans and to remove the worst
handicaps from the Slaughter-House decision.
Opinions differ as to the ethical and legal points raised by Justice Field's
court plan and the "Ninth Circuit law." The gains and losses resulting
from abandonment of the positions assumed by the majority in the
Slaughter-House Cases are today so mixed that it would be difficult to
criticize Field's maneuvers at circuit even if it could be demonstrated that
they alone had caused the revolutionary shifts. The range of the rights
embraced by due process and equal protection and the tendency of the
courts continually to redefine and extend the rights demands recognition
of the dual character of Field's contribution.
Similarly, if it is granted that the merits of a case and whether a court
properly may substitute its judgment for the legislature's are generally
the crucial questions in most constitutional debates, it is academic to criti-
cize Field for stretching phraseological limits and for enlarging constitu-
tional jurisdiction. Biased he obviously was, and at times, especially after
1877, lacking in judicial temperament and open-mindedness. Yet he was
a slave to duty-steadfast, conscientious, almost puritanical in his reso-
lute determination. The Reconstruction cases made him one of the lead-
ing advocates of natural rights doctrines which were possessed of great
intrinsic appeal and limitless possibilities for expansion. His psycho-
logical state impelled him to explore and refine the attributes of these
doctrines. In the Chinese cases at circuit he won assent to interpretations
of the equal protection clause which, if they had continued to be debated
in economic and political terms, might have aroused momentous contro-
versy. Whether in these cases Field exercised more than a circuit Justice's
customary freedom of expression depends upon whether the majority ever
seriously believed it to be either possible or desirable permanently to re-
strict the scope of section one to persons of the Negro race, whether Field
himself understood such to be the majority's intention and was thus
honor-bound by it, and whether the broad phraseology employed by the
drafters would have supported any attempt so to limit the section.
Fortunately, an estimate of Field's contribution, and of the importance
of his circuit opinions, does not depend upon answering these questions.
Whatever his motives, it is obvious that he pioneered the prevailing
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interpretation of the equal protection clause; he capitalized the rhetorical
advantages of the Chinese cases; he probably helped as much as Cooley
or John A. Campbell to fashion the forensic weapons that counsel needed.
This is his great, if not an altogether lasting, achievement. It is the basis
upon which his career should be judged. If, as seems likely, the threat of
Court-packing has now become part of our unwritten constitution, assur-
ing less divergence between popular desires and constitutional decisions,
there is a profound, almost involute, irony in the fact that Field himself
stood ready to launch this innovation.
III.
Although many of the problems of Justice Field's career and the para-
doxes of his motivation may require further specialized study, one at
least is now clearer and more sharply defined. This is his central role in
expanding judicial power and in reading an economic content into the
clauses of section one. Surveying matters broadly, and fitting facts in
historical perspective, we may briefly summarize our findings.
Justice Field's important contributions to the development of the laisse.-
faire doctrine of freedom of contract, and to the establishment of revo-
lutionary substantive due process, were essentially products of a convic-
tion that the salvation of democracy lay in a judicial trusteeship. Judges
must construe governmental powers strictly, and private rights broadly,
toward the end that state interference be held to a minimum and anything
savoring of the" collectivist doctrines which Field associated with the vio-
lence and bloodshed of the Commune be rendered forever impossible
and unconstitutional. Fortuitously, the Fourteenth Amendment was ad-
vanced as an economic and political weapon at exactly the time Field was
preoccupied with this crucial problem of statecraft. Perceiving the Amend-
ment's uses as an instrument of judicial restraint, he seized it avidly, and
sought in the Slaughter-House and Granger cases to develop its capacities,
but failed to convince the majority of his brethren of the expediency of
such restraint. Frustrated, he sought to accomplish his purposes by singu-
larly direct means. Failing in politics, he nevertheless succeeded, through
a brilliant understanding of how the law grew and how it might be made
to grow, in fostering development, through humanitarian cases unen-
cumbered by political niceties, of those very doctrines for which skilled
constitutional lawyers had before argued in vain and which they later ex-
ploited to the fullest degree.
By conditioning a state of mind which stigmatized as "Communistic"
the efforts of agrarian and labor groups to control the abuses of unregu-
lated and publicly subsidized businesses, the Paris Commune tragically
confused American social thinking, came close to subverting the basic
tenets of democracy, and set in motion forces which caused constitutional
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theory often to run counter to social needs. Because of this fateful anach-
ronism, and by extraordinary conjunction of circumstances, purely "in-
dividualistic" enterprise was thus enshrined in the Constitution just as
it ceased to be an economic fact; exercise of social and economic control,
on the other hand, was discredited, and the motives of those sponsoring
it made suspect, just as it became economically necessary and inevitable.
In the light of this breach between theory and practice, it is not too much
to say that the Paris Commune helped lay the foundations for a constitu-
tional crisis which took two generations to mature and which ended only
recently in repudiation of the Fieldian viewpoints.
